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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 19 WINTER 1985 NuMBER 2
DEATH OF A SALESMAN'S DOCTRINE: A
CRITICAL LOOK AT TRADEMARK USE
Michael H. Davis*
INTRODUCTION
A trademark is a salesman. It does the work of its owner by
wearing a smile, by presenting a good image, and in Willy Loman's
words, by being well liked.1 It is, of course, the usual view that the
death of the salesman, Willy Loman, was a suicide. But certainly
lawyers know that causation is always problematical. Willy's case is
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-M~arshall College of Law, Cleveland State Uni-
versity; Member, Well Liked, Conference on Critical Legal Studies; Co-Author, A. MILER &
M. DAvis, INTELLECTUAL PRoPErY: PATENTS, TRADEARKS. AND CoPYIGr (1983). Occidental
College, B.A., 1967; Hofstra University, J.D., 1975; Harvard University, LL.M., 1979. The
author thanks Mark Fleischer and John Oreh for their valuable assistance.
1 See infra notes 16 & 86. As the title suggests, I refer at various points in this article to
Death of a Salesman, in A. MILLER, ARTHUR MILLER'S COLLECTED PLAys (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Death of a Salesman]. A disclaimer is therefore appropriate; the references to the
play are neither criticisms of its merits nor claims about its intentions. The merits of Death
of a Salesman, whatever they may be, have been debated passionately since the play's first
Broadway production. "It is, not surprisingly, a miserable affair;, and it would be unfair to
single it out here from among the many Broadway productions which are completely devoid
of merit, were it not for just this excessive publicity which it has received." Morgan, Notes
on the Theatre, 2 HUDsON Ray. 269, 272 (1949). The play's recent revival has been no less
controversial. Dudar, A Modern Tragedy's Road to Maturity, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1984,
§ 2, at 1. The same is true of Miller's intentions, which have been debated not only by
critics but by Miller himself. A. MILER, Introduction, in ARTHUR MILLER'S CoLLECTED
PLAYS 1, 3 (1957); see Driver, Strength and Weakness in Arthur Miller, 4 TuL DRAmA Rv,
May, 1960, at 45; Dudar, supra. I use Death of a Salesman because it effectively dramatizes
for many audiences, first, some of the more profound effects of the market economy upon its
subjects and, second, the relation of symbols and myths in our society to social reality. See
T. PoRTER, MYTH AND MODERN AmERicAN DRAmA 127-52 (1969).
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no different. Howard, Willy's boss, did as much as anyone to kill
Willy when he fired him the afternoon of Willy's death. The sales-
man's price was too high for Howard and that surely led to Willy's
tragic end.2
Willy, with increasing anger: Howard, all I need to set my
table is fifty dollars a week.
Howard:... but it's a business, kid, and everybody's gotta
pull his own weight.
Willy: If I had forty dollars a week-that's all I'd need.
Forty dollars, Howard.
Howard: Kid, I can't take blood from a stone.'
Trademarks must be paid, too. The price of a trademark is deter-
mined by the common law doctrine of trademark use, which re-
quires that the potential trademark owner take the risk of develop-
ing the trademark with no assurance of ownership of the mark.4
The owner thus must first demonstrate the competitive worth of
the goods or services to which the mark is attached without any
prior exclusive claim to the mark.
Trademark use-the requirement that the prospective owner
must, through use of the mark, develop an association between the
mark and the goods before acquiring secure ownership of the
mark-has been perceived to be a stiff price to pay. Owners, natu-
rally, have tried to lower this cost by reducing the requirements of
the trademark use doctrine. Because trademark use is a form of
consumer protection, each time the doctrine is eroded, the consum-
ing public is injured. But, due to the pressures of industry and the
trademark bar, various forms of "token" use have been urged upon
and progressively accepted by the Patent and Trademark Office
since the Lanham Act,5 which provides for federal registration of
trademarks, was passed in 1946.
Due to the assault upon the requirement of prior trademark use
and the growth of a token use doctrine, what happened to Willy
2 For another explanation, see infra note 141.
3 Death of a Salesman, supra note 1, at 179-81.
" See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
[Vol. 19:233234
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Loman has happened to the trademark use doctrine. In the end, it
seemed too expensive and it was killed off-partially by its own
hand, due to its own internal contradictions, and partially by
trademark owners who had gained the favor of the Patent and
Trademark Office. The death of a doctrine meant to protect the
ordinary public, like the death of the tired and worn-down sales-
man, may actually be an advantage for established business firms;
it is a tragedy only for the ordinary person that the doctrine, and
the salesman, symbolized. What made Willy Loman's death possi-
ble was a world of moral ambiguity-the market economy-that
functioned according to an illegitimate set of rules, but whose sep-
arateness preserved the apparent legitimacy of the rest of society.
The death of trademark use was similarly due to a world of legal
ambiguity-the administrative arena-whose rules are likewise il-
legitimate, but whose separateness helps preserve the legitimacy of
the legal system. This Article traces the evolution and decline of
the trademark use doctrine and examines the jurisprudential cir-
cumstances that led, perhaps inevitably, to its present moribund
state.
I TRADEMARK THEORY
A. The Anticompetitive Nature of Trademark Law
Naturally, the legitimacy of the free enterprise system depends
upon free competition. The ability of and opportunity for newcom-
ers to compete is essential to a meaningful "free" market.0 The
ability to differentiate products that are viable substitutes, how-
ever, tends to decrease competition because that differentiation
prevents consumers from perceiving those products as substitutes.
Trademarks are one way of differentiating goods that are in fact
equivalents; to the extent consumers prefer one mark over another,
the market is distorted. Economically irrational consumer prefer-
ences have at least two deleterious effects: (1) they effectively allow
established firms to raise their prices to a point at which, absent
those preferences, new entrants would otherwise find it profitable
to enter the market, and, thus, (2) they make it difficult for new
6 J. BuN, BARRIERs To NEw CozsrmoN 1-41 (1965).
1985]
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firms to enter the market.7
Much trademark literature is sterile, devoid of analytical criti-
cism. It commonly consists of a sort of juvenile name-calling: "It's
a monopoly!" "No, it's competitive!"8 One reason why trademarks
have not been critically analyzed is the mistaken assumption,
noted by Edward H. Chamberlin, that monopoly and competition
are mutually incompatible.9 The failure to realize that monopoly
and competition can coexist explains much of the ignorance over
trademarks. At best, a trademark is a very limited monopoly; it is,
however, unquestionably a restraint upon competition. And, per-
haps counterintuitively, its anticompetitive economic impact may
be far more important than a traditionally recognized monopoly
.7
In general, product differentiation may lead to significant buyer preferences be.
tween established products and the products of new entrant firms. There is a good a
priori possibility, moreover, that most buyers will on balance prefer established and
known products to new and unknown ones. Of four major established brands of soap
flakes there may be none enjoying a clearly preferred position over the others; each
may have a large following of loyal customers who will remain loyal as long as the
prices of the four are closely similar. But if a new brand of soap flakes were intro-
duced by an entrant, the great bulk of the buyers of all four established brands might
very well prefer any of those four brands to the new unknown, with the result that
the entrant could secure an appreciable market, if at all, only by making some finan-
cial sacrifice not incurred by the established firms. Thus a general tendency of buyers
to prefer established to new products may place potential entrants to a differenti-
ated-product industry at a disadvantage as compared to firms already established in
the industry.
If the potential entrant suffers some "product-differentiation disadvantage," the
established firms should, by virtue of their advantage, be able to elevate their long-
run price above minimal costs by some corresponding amount without attracting
entry.
Id. at 116; see also Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called 'Product
Differentiation,' 18 Am. U.L. REv. 1 (1968).
8 A sampling of the literature follows: "The law of trademarks ...is not, as sometimes
supposed, either allied with or related to the law of patents. Indeed, the two are more nearly
antithetical than alike . . ..Patents are legal monopolies-trademarks are competitive
tools." Leeds, Trademarks-The Rationale of Registrability, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 653,
653 (1958), reprinted in 48 TRADE-MARK REP. 903, 903 (1958). "[O]ur common law grants a
perpetual monopoly to exclude others from using a mark. . . provided only that the trade-
mark owner be the first to use the mark." Kegan, Trademark "Use"--Fact or Fiction?, 55
TRADE-MARK REP. 175, 178 (1965). "Trademarks are entirely distinguishable from patents
and copyrights .... The right to a trademark is a right of property." Van Santen, Proposed
Trademark Legislation on a Recording System for Declarations of Intent, 50 TRADE-MARK
REP. 221, 221-22 (1960).
9 E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPEITION (8th ed. 1962).
236
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such as a patent. "It would ordinarily be supposed that the degree
of monopoly was greater in the case of patents. Yet the huge pres-
tige value of such names as 'Ivory,' 'Kodak,' 'Uneeda,' 'Coca-Cola,'
and 'Old Dutch Cleanser,' to cite only a few, is sufficient at least to
make one sceptical."10
In essence, the issue of trademark use is whether the limited
trademark monopoly should be granted to private interests more
liberally and easily. The issue is whether competition will be sacri-
ficed without a compensating public benefit. But this functional
issue is frequently unobserved because of the failure to understand
the anticompetitive nature of the trademark monopoly. The an-
ticompetitive nature of trademark law is concealed because it de-
pends upon a real, rather than abstract, understanding of human
nature. Unless one is willing to question the hypothetical rational-
ity upon which "Economic Man" depends and, still more, unless
one is willing to recognize the possibility of "false consciousness,""'
10 Id. at 62. Chamberlin continues:
It would be impossible to compute satisfactorily for comparison the value of the mo-
nopoly rights granted by the United States Government in the form of patents and
copyrights, and the value of those existing in the form of trade.marks, trade names,
and good-will. The insuperable difficulty would be the definition (for purpoes of de-
duction from total profits) of "competitive" returns, and of profits attributable to
other monopoly elements. Allowance would also have to be made for the difference in
duration of patents and trade-marks, for the enhanced value of patents in many cases
by combination, and for other factors. But merely to suggest such a comparison is to
raise serious doubts as to whether the monopoly element in patents is even quantita-
tively as important as that in trade-marks.
Id.
11 See Davis, Critical Jurisprudence: An Essay on The Legal Theory of Robert Burt's
Taking Care of Strangers, 1981 Wis. L REv. 419. In researching the idea of false conscious-
ness in literature and law, I was struck by the following quotation from an article nominally
about contract and tort law-
The false consciousness involved is in part that people who agree to work a whole
lifetime for the same employer on an at-will contract without any provision for their
retirement have underestimated how seriously dependent they will be. Had they not
been mistaken, they would have risen in revolt, or they would have scrimped and
saved.
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. Rav. 562, 628
(1982). Willy Loman apparently worked his entire life for one man and then that man's son.
Duncan Kennedy's comment is just a sanitized report of Willy's anguish the day he was
fired:
Willy, stopping him: I'm talking about your father! There were promises made
across this desk! You mustn't tell me you've got people to see-I put thirty-four years
intb this firm, Howard, and now I can't pay my insurance! You can't eat the orange
1985]
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the real nature of trademarks will remain obscured.
Courts have, at times, recognized the irrational nature of the
market economy and even, without calling it so, the existence of
false consciousness. Justice Frankfurter effectively noted the
concept:
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a
purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human
propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmo-
sphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol.12
What better description of false consciousness can be made than
the phrase, "what he has been led to believe he wants."'13 Of
course, Justice Frankfurter's comment needs some qualification.
The trademark owner has something of value only because the law
has first promised to protect it. Justice Frankfurter is guilty of le-
gal formalism here because he assumes that the concept of value is
independent of the positivistic legal structure that secures it. If the
legal system refused to protect marks that distort the market econ-
and throw the peel away-a man is not a piece of fruit!
Death of a Salesman, supra note 1, at 181. A few hours later, Willy was dead.
12 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
Justice Frankfurter elaborated upon the relationship between the law of trademarks and
human psychology:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function
of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase
goods by them.. . . Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey
through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the com-
modity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has some-
thing of value.
Id.
13 Critics have noted the centrality of notions of falsity in Death of a Salesman: "Leman
has displaced his self in an almost universally prevalent falsity." Clurman, Arthur Miller's
Later Plays, in ARTHUR MILLER 166 (R. Corrigan ed. 1969). They have even noted the rela-
tionship of that falsity to marketing: "So he lives in a vacuum, a vapor of meaningless com-
mercial slogans." Id. at 146; see also T. PORTER, supra note 1, at 151 ("The salesman's ver-
sion of the success myth-the cult of personality-is shown to be a tissue of false values
that lead only to frustration."). In fact, critics have termed the play's central dilemma as
one of "false consciousness": "The persuasive atmosphere of the play . . . is one of false
consciousness-the conditioned attitudes in which Loman trains his sons-being broken
into by real consciousness, in actual life and relationships. The expressionist method em-
bodies this false consciousness much more powerfully than naturalism could do." Williams,
The Realism of Arthur Miller, 1 CRITICAL Q. 140, 145-46 (1959).
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omy, marketers would not invest so much to "impregnate" the
mark with a "congenial" gloss. Instead they would invest in their
products and "impregnate" them with some superior competitive
quality.14
More recently, this distorting effect of trademarks upon compe-
tition has been examined by the Ninth Circuit. Noting the psycho-
logical nature of trademarks, the court recognized their irrational
appeal and the opportunity for business to capitalize on that fact.
It also noted the possibility of public harm and the equally unde-
sirable effect that "barriers to entry" have on new firms seeking to
enter the market.15
" While trademark law thus seems to be a relatively trivial marketing tool, it really
amounts to a decision about how power is distributed in our society. It is perceived as al-
most subversive to carry Justice Frankfurters observations to their logical end-that maybe
there is something wrong, perhaps fascistic, with a reluctance to give people what they
"want." Serious discussions often commence with high-sounding abstractions and then de-
generate into something close to name-calling. Those who urge only superficial analysis of
trademarks quickly seize what they conceive to be the high ground by promoting freedom of
consumer choice.
[I]t seems plausible if it is based on the dogma of consumer autonomy. Then anyone
who questions the untrammelled use of influence by the seller and its uncoerced ac-
ceptance by the buyer is at best a Puritan, at worst a Fascist. The debate seems to
end in a defense of freedom, for the advertiser as well as for the consumer.
But does the sovereign consumer have real freedom ... ?
Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YAMX
LJ. 1165, 1181-82 (1948).
The debate resolves unsurprisingly into a political question. The label freedom is opposed
to that of Fascist, and all this argument at the altar of profits. Something about it should
make the observer uneasy if not suspicious. The confusion is created in the upside-down
presentation of the question. That is, it is in the assertion that these abstractions are true,
rather than in the investigation of their substance, that false conclusions are derived from
obviously false premises. "The economist, whose dour lexicon defines as irrational any mar-
ket behavior not dictated by a logical pecuniary calculus, may think it irrational to buy
illusions; but there is a degree of that kind of irrationality even in economic man; and con-
suming man is full of it." Id. at 1181. However, trademark law has a decisive, perhaps sole,
role in creating the need itself. Were it not for the enforcement of the marketers interest,
these "illusions" would be bad investments; the public "wants" these things only because
trademark law becomes a partner in their promotion.
15 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
The primary value of the modem trademark lies in the "conditioned reflex developed
in the buyer by imaginative or often purely monotonous selling of the mark itself."
To the extent that advertising of this type succeeds, it is suggested, the trademark is
endowed with sales appeal independent of the quality or price of the product to
which it is attached; economically irrational elements are introduced into consumer
choices; and the trademark owner is insulated from the normal pressures of price and
quality competition. In consequence the competitive system fails to perform its func-
tiofi of allocating available resources efficiently.
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Yet, all this talk about "psychological symbols," "barriers to en-
try," and "product differentiation" avoids the issue. When
Chamberlin wrote that products that should be mutual substitutes
are artificially differentiated by a well-known mark, he meant that
the supposed ability of the consumer to intelligently identify sub-
stantively equivalent goods was handicapped. The consumer be-
lieves that goods that are equivalent are really not. Characterizing
trademarks as psychological symbols is meaningless unless one un-
derstands that the psychological impact of the symbol is strong
enough to overcome the intelligent choice from which competition
derives its sole legitimacy. A trademark cannot be a barrier to en-
try unless the new product's benefits and superior characteristics
are insufficient to break into the market. Thus, trademarks are a
barrier to entry only because they interfere with the ability of the
consumer to judge new products-only because the assumed ra-
tional, intelligent choice of the consumer is a fiction. To be effec-
tive, in other words, trademarks must be very well liked.10
Chamberlin essentially disagreed with a fundamental assumption
of the free market: that individuals are capable of intelligently
making the choices on which the efficiency of a free market de-
pends. Other commentators have made the same observation. 17
B. Trademark Use
There are essentially two views of trademark law. The conven-
tional view assumes that trademark rights relate only to the use of
the mark itself. The critical view recognizes that far more is at
stake, for domination of the mark in today's economy frequently
leads to domination of the marketplace."8
Moreover, the economically irrelevant appeal of highly publicized trademarks is
thought to constitute a barrier to the entry of new competition into the market.
Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
"0 The centrality (and the problem) of being "well liked" to both Willy Loman and to the
market economy that he reflected, has always been devastatingly clear to critics and audi-
ence: "'Be liked and you will never want,' Willy advises his sons; and his famous distinction
between being 'liked' and being 'well liked' seems to rest on whether or not the liking can be
exploited for practical ends." Parker, Point of View in Arthur Miller's Death of a Sales-
man, 35 U. TORONTO Q. 144, 151 (1966).
17 See J. BAIN, supra note 6, at 203-04; Deering, Trade-marks on Noncompetitive Prod-
ucts, 36 OR. L. REv. 1 (1956); Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L.
REv. 503 (1956).
"8 That there are at least two views of trademark law should not be surprising. There
[Vol. 19:233
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The conventional view misses the complexity of trademark doc-
trine by concentrating exclusively on its monopolistic elements.
According to the conventional view, prior commercial trademark
use is required, with the potential owner investing meaningful re-
sources before the mark can be monopolized, because the public
has an interest in preserving free access to the mark as long as
possible. Only after the potential owner has given assurances-by
risking a significant investment in the device-that the mark has
attained a distinctive identity with the goods can the owner then
monopolize the mark. In return for the investment, under the con-
ventional view, the public is willing to deed over a limited interest
in the device. 19 The Fifth Circuit, for instance, has articulated es-
must always be a conventional view that incorporates the dominant political givens, and
then another, critical, view, which includes within its analysis a criticism of those givens.
The same division seems true of literary criticism. The two competing interpretations of
Death of a Salesman are polar and analogous to the views of trademark law. The dominant
view is that our society-including its market economy--allows people sufficient opportu-
nity for self-fulfillment. Thus, the play accuses Willy of failing to fulfill his own personhood
'The verdict is always guilty and it is a verdict based upon Miller's belief that if each man
faced up to the truth about himself, he could be fulfilled as an individual and still live
within the restrictions of society." Corrigan, Introduction: The Achievement of Arthur
Miller, in ARTmm MILEzR 3 (RL Corrigan ed. 1969). The critical view is that Willy's end was
dictated by a society that imposes demands fundamentally inconsistent with human nature,
pitting Willy against a system in which the cards are inevitably stacked against him.
Loman perceives he has "accomplished" nothing but it is still "the greatest country
in the world" even if "personal attractiveness" gets you nowhere. He perceives that
"the competition is maddening ......
Once a Loman's energy is drained by his society he is thrown aside, in this case
casually sacked by the son of the man who has been his boss for thirty-four
years ....
Mottram, Arthur Miller: The Development of a Political Dramatist in America, in Ammu-
cAN Ti mm 127, 135 (J.RL Brown & B. Harris eds. 1967). Just as trademark law is subject
to polar interpretations because it tries to resolve two irreconcilables-property and compe-
tition-the polar interpretations of Death of a Salesman exist because Miller "split his play
between social causation and individual responsibility for Willy's fate." J. GAssana, Tim
TimATR N OUR Timns 347 (1954).
"' The interest is limited because trademark ownership is significantly less extensive than
copyright ownership and radically less extensive than patent rights. Trademark rights exist
only as long as the mark is used, although there is no fixed limit on protection so that,
theoretically, they could be perpetual. However, exclusive rights apply only to use as a
trademark; thus, non-trademark, collateral use of the mark by others is not prohibited. See
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264
U.S. 359 (1924). On the other hand, patent rights, though lasting only 17 years, forbid any
manufacture, sale, or use of the invention for all purposes. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). There is
no requirement that the patentee use or work the patent to maintain the patent rights.
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sentially this view. "The acquisition of such a right through use
represents the passage of a word or design out of the public do-
main into the protective ambits of trademark law."20 But this con-
ventional view, which characterizes trademark law and its poten-
tial problems as one simply of monopoly, trivializes trademark law.
If the problem of trademark law were simply the monopolization of
words and devices used as trademarks, there would be little public
loss or interest. The monopolization of a word can hardly compare
to the monopolization of an industry. The public stake in trade-
mark law under the conventional analysis is minimal. Under this
analysis, copyrights and patents, which monopolize actual products
(inventions, artistic property, and all sorts of obviously profitable
goods), appear to be more serious threats to the public welfare.
A critical analysis, on the other hand, shows that trademark use
is important because, to the extent it imposes a substantive (rather
than a token) burden upon the marketer, there is some assurance
that the anticompetitive and monopolistic grant of trademark
rights is justified. Just as copyrights and patents are enforced only
when a court is convinced by assessing the benefits and burdens
that the monopoly is justified,21 trademark use assures that the
owner has successfully marketed a product that has some economi-
cally rational and inherent appeal aside from the mark itself.
When trademark use is reduced to a procedural requirement,22 the
Similarly, copyright protection, which does not end until 50 years after the author's death
or, generally, a total of 75 years for corporate authors, extends to a wide range of "copies,"
or functionally equivalent exclusive rights. In general, these rights include not only straight-
forward copying but also derivative works and rights to display, perform, and distribute. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
20 Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1014
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
21 In patent law, the monopoly is enforceably valid only if the invention can be character-
ized as the application of an idea rather than the idea itself. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). Similarly, in copyright, the monopoly is
enforceably valid only if the work of authorship can be characterized as an expression of an
idea and not the idea itself. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). Both the idea/
application and the idea/expression dichotomies effectively incorporate a calculus that com-
pares the benefits and burdens to society and to the inventor/author of granting the
monopoly.
22 Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975), justified substituting
token use for trademark use by characterizing trademark use as a procedural device. The
Patent and Trademark Office has similarly attempted to sanitize token use by insisting
there is a meaningful distinction between accepting token use for registration purposes and
[Vol. 19:233
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trademark monopoly loses all social justification.
This critical view proceeds from a more incisive analysis first
broached by Chamberlin. 3 Under this approach, the requirement
of real and prior commercial use as a prerequisite to trademark
ownership represents an interesting way of squaring the circle of
monopoly and competition. For more than 200 years, it has been
understood that property and competition are not separate formal-
istic conceptions but are instead opposites along the continuum of
the market economy.24 Chamberlin simply elaborated upon this
point. Property law recognizes the right at a certain point to be
free from competition; intellectual property generally and trade-
marks specifically are particular applications of that notion. Be-
cause of their distortion of the market, far from being a trivial mo-
nopoly over a word or symbol, trademark rights are the equivalent
allowing it to determine priority between adversaries contesting ownership. See Selfmay,
Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc., 579 F.2d 75 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Old Swiss House, Inc. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 569 F.2d 1130 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
2K CHAmnERuN, supra note 9. Chamberlin, who was a professor of political economy at
Harvard University, wrote the first edition of The Theory of Monopolistic Competition in
1933. Chamberlin's analysis is the basis of what McClure calls the "Harvard school" in the
economic analysis of trademarks. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical
History of Legal Thought, 69 TR=a--MARK REP. 305, 346 (1979).
24 P.J. Proudhon's answer "It is robbery," to the question, "What is property?," leads
inevitably to this conclusion. P.J. PROUDHONo WHAT IS PROPERTi? 11 (B. Tucker trans. 1970).
The evils of competition did not dominate Proudhon's work, however. The exploitation of
labor concerned him far more than the newly developing competitive exploitation among
and between the bourgeois merchant class, of which trademark is a principal symbol Prou-
dhon's collateral conclusion, that it is "a deplorable error" to assume that the opposite of a
system of property is communism, was based on his own attempt to square the circle. See
id. at 259. Although opposed to unfair, exploitative property, he favored a limited, posses-
sory form of it. See id. at 285.
Seemingly aware of the apparent contradictions in this philosophy, Proudhon attempted
to resolve them in later works. What he said especially applies to trademark law.
As long as a product is only made by one producer, the product's actual value re-
mains a mystery, either through deceit or through the inability or inattention of its
producer to have its price drop to its lowest limit.
Therefore, any exclusive right of production is an actual harm to society, and com-
mercial advertising, like labor competition, is a necessity. All imagined and imagina-
ble utopias cannot avoid this law.
PJ. PROUDHON, Syst~me des contradictions economiques ou philosophic de Ia misre, in
O xVRES CoMPLrS DE P.J. PRoUDHoN 212 (Nouvelle ed. 1923) [author's translation].
"Competition does not act with all the destructive force it has within itself-but that
changes nothing about its contradictory nature." Id. at 225. "Monopoly is the natural oppo-
site of competition.... But seeing that competition is necessary, it implies the idea of
monopoly since monopoly is like the head office of each individual competitor." Id. at 249.
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of copyright and patent. Trademarks restrain competition over the
goods themselves. Thus, the requirement of use in trade is a
profound one, setting the price of, and drawing a line that defines,
a particular distribution of wealth in our society.
Where to draw that line, however, is a value judgment. Yet the
language of property and of legal formalism allows this value judg-
ment to appear as a nonpolitical given. Since trademark ownership
signals the end of the marketer's vulnerability to free competition,
the question of where to draw the line is a crucial one. To simply
draw the line in a vacuum-to grant "property" in marks to all
comers-is to surrender without even a battle and perhaps to make
the political forces a bit too obvious.
Trademark use has somewhat cleverly drawn the line by insist-
ing that the marketer freely compete until a certain amount of suc-
cess has been reached-until the product or service has succeeded
in the market economy so that a segment of consumers has associ-
ated the mark with the goods. The doctrine thus requires use of
the mark "in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the
marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as
those of the adoptor of the mark,"25 a substantive requirement re-
cently reiterated as "the type of public exposure of a mark that
would be expected to have [a] significant impact on the purchasing
public. 12 6 Ownership then follows. 27 This requirement of public as-
sociation is clever because it is an astute way of having one's cake
25 New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 1951).
26 Old Swiss House, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 569 F.2d 1130, 1133 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see
also Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc., 579 F.2d 75, 79 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ("such usage
must have been of such a nature and extent as to create an association in the mind of the
consuming public between the mark and the services to be rendered"); Martha White
Foods, Inc. v. Western Grain Co., 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299, 300 (TTAB 1969) (use in trade
must be "of such a nature and extent that the term or slogan has become popularized in the
public mind as identifying the product of the user thereof"), afl'd sub nom. Jim Dandy Co.
v. Martha White Foods, Inc., 458 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
27 It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid an element of formalism at some point in
the analysis, even if conducted under the most "realistic" conditions, not merely because the
concept of "ownership" tends to foreclose further discussion. "Interest balancing," even if it
avoids notions of property and ownership, still postulates a continuum over which the calcu-
lations occur-but, more important, along which evaluations are possible. This continuum
implies some real, immanent unit or conception that exists outside of raw politics. A critical
analysis, however, reveals that what is going on is an affective response to the problem of
allocating (ripping off?) power. See Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Pri-
vate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982).
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and eating it. It appears to effect an even-handed bargain between
the public and the marketer by requiring a limited period of com-
petition before monopoly is granted. Yet, in a market economy
that is supposedly based upon free competition, this doctrine still
fails to explain why a monopoly should ever be granted, even after
the required marketing success.
A doctrine of token trademark use, on the other hand, reduces
this test of the product to nothing. Through token use, ownership
in marks is granted to marketers who have not demonstrated that
their products or services deserve protection from further competi-
tion. If there is genius in trademark use, it is in its skillful balanc-
ing of the contradictory concepts of monopoly and competition. In
a way, then, the token use doctrines represent a confession, an ex-
haustion, an inability or unwillingness to perform that balance.
Naturally, marketers desire to minimize competition to domi-
nate and monopolize the market. Trademark law itself expresses
that desire by affording protection from competition. It is unsur-
prising then that this protection eventually has become not the
conclusion but the premise. Instead of concluding that protection
is merited by a demonstration of successful competition, trade-
mark practice, especially at the Patent and Trademark Office, fre-
quently raises the need for this protection as a reason to grant it. 28
If one assumes that trademark law exists to encourage the security
and profits of marketers, this premise puts trademark law on its
head and inevitably produces decisions designed to further those
profits possibly at the expense of the consumer. It is thus not sur-
prising that a token use in trade29 is frequently justified by saying
that it is too onerous and expensive to require an enterprise to do
what the Lanham Act expressly demands: to gamble on the actual
trade use of a mark before it is eligible for registration." An
agency or system of administrative law devoted to protecting its
charges from competition may be excused for sympathizing with
its clients. After all, that system is itself a salesperson marketing a
See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Midwest Chrome Process Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
758, 764 (ITAB 1974); see also infra text accompanying notes 68-69 & 125-28.
29 For a discussion of how the Patent and Trademark Office created a token use in trade
doctrine by collapsing the substantive use in trade requirement into the legitimately token
"use in commerce" requirement of the Lanham Act, see infra text accompanying notes 32-
88.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 54, 65, 69 & 126 and note 65.
1985]
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product-trademarks in this case-and salespersons exist to sell.
Additionally complicating the development of a token use doc-
trine is the fact that most other countries do not have such a bur-
densome requirement as use in trade. These countries have intent-
to-use statutes that allow a company, under certain circumstances,
to claim a mark by declaring the intent to use it. Cases that under-
mine the use in trade requirement by adopting token use have
sometimes referred to the advantages of the intent-to-use standard
to justify their actions. Ironically, they usually cite our failure to
enact an intent-to-use statute as justification for creating its judi-
cial equivalent.3 1
II. THE ASSAULT UPON TRADEMARK USE
A. The Requirements of Use in Trade and Use in Commerce
Federal trademark law is unusual because, although it is created
by federal statute, most of its underlying substance is derived from
and is intended to remain part of state common law. Thus, the
most basic black letter law of trademarks holds that federal trade-
mark law is simply a system of registration of state rights. This
rule is no longer strictly true, however, because the 1946 Lanham
Act creates several important federal substantive rights.32 Never-
31 See infra notes 54 & 127 and accompanying text. Parenthetically, however, intent-to-
use systems present problems along with benefits to marketers desiring a wide range of
available marks. American marketers have encountered difficulties in countries where marks
may be owned, or suddenly become owned (upon the news that the Americans are coming),
without any use at all. A typical transaction may involve a canny host country citizen who,
learning that an American marketer intends to enter the country, files an intent to use the
mark with the host country trademark agency. The citizen is then equipped with sufficient
leverage to sell (extort?) the mark back to the marketer at a handsome profit. For an exam-
ple, see Japan Trademarks Can Prove Elusive, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1983, at D4, col. 1,
which recounts incidents involving both McDonald's and Coca-Cola in Japan. Although we
have no similar institutionalized procedures here, American marketers still manage to main-
tain a "stable" of potential trademarks though abuse of the present system, and apparently
find such a marketing structure satisfactory. See Fletcher, "Time Out," "Snob," "Wipe
Out" and "Chicken of the Sea": The Death Knell of "Token Use'?, 65 TRADE-MARK REP.
336, 336 (1975); Kegan, supra note 8, at 180; Whittredge, The Practical Trademark Appli-
cation-Founded on Intended Use of the Mark; Dirksen Bill, S. 2786, 54 TRADE-MARK REP.
883, 886-87 (1964); see also infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. Not all courts, how-
ever, have reacted favorably to such trademark maintenance programs. See, e.g., Exxon
Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 102 (5th Cir. 1983) (characterizing an alleg-
edly extreme example of trademark maintenance as a "warehousing program").
32 Burger King, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
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theless, outside those specifically identifiable substantive rights
(constructive notice and incontestability being the most impor-
tant), substantive federal trademark rights are still generally deter-
mined by underlying state common law doctrines.
Because of the confusion caused by the unusual federal/state
structure of federal trademark law, it has been claimed that "it is
axiomatic that trademark rights, including the right to apply for
federal registration, arise upon the single shipment of a marked
article in interstate commerce."33 Axiomatically, this claim is mis-
taken. In terms of how the Patent and Trademark Office operates,
though, the claim is substantially true.
To understand why the claim is mistaken, it is necessary to
know that there are two requirements for an enforceable federally
registered trademark. One is "use in commerce" and the other is
"use in trade. '3 4 The distinction between use in trade and use in
commerce, at least at the theoretical level, is an accepted one.35
While both these requirements are statutory, they have distinc-
tively different legal sources. Use in commerce is constitutionally
mandated; use in trade is effectively common law. Both, however,
come from the first sentence of the Lanham Act. Section 1 pro-
vides that "[tihe owner of a trademark used in commerce may reg-
ister his trademark." 6 Because one cannot own a trademark unless
one first uses it in trade, the word "owner" states the requirement
Congress expanded the common law... by granting an exclusive right in commerce
to federal registrants in areas where there has been no offsetting use of the mark-
Congress intended the Lanham Act to afford nation-wide protection to federally-
registered marks, and that once the certificate has issued, no person can acquire any
additional rights superior to those obtained by the federal registrant.
Id. at 908; see also S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 860 (1949).
33 Kegan, supra note 8, at 181.
3 Use in commerce is sometimes called registration use; use in trade is sometimes called
ownership or trade use. For a more elementary, but perhaps more accessible, explanation of
the trademark use problem, see A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, INTEL.cEruAL PaoPamrr 221-29
(1983).
"See Leeds, supra note 8. Leeds accurately distinguishes the two as follovs: "The date
upon which the product was regularly sold in its ordinary trade channels is the date of first
use [in trade]. The date upon which the product bearing the mark was sold or transported
in interstate, international or territorial commerce is the date of first use in commerce." Id.
at 655, 48 TRADE-MARK REP. at 905. Leeds goes on to emphasize that the two uses can
coincide but that the less substantial requirement-use in commerce--can never precede
the more substantial use in trade.
3- 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
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of use in trade. The words "used in commerce" are, similarly, the
source of the use in commerce requirement that provides federal
jurisdiction by satisfying the commerce clause's constitutional
mandate. 7
Until recently, there was no confusion between use in trade to
gain ownership over the mark and use in commerce to qualify for
federal registration. Use in commerce was recognized as an insub-
stantial jurisdictional and procedural requirement. Use in trade
was uniformly recognized as a substantive requirement.38
Use in commerce is required for constitutional reasons. Ever
since the Trade Mark Cases,39 courts have recognized that federal
powers over trademarks arise from the commerce clause and that
those powers require interstate use in commerce to be legitimate.
In many ways, use in commerce is nothing more than a jurisdic-
tional requirement.0 For instance, in Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil
Co.,4 1 Judge Learned Hand treated use in commerce as "jurisdic-
tional," upholding federal regulation of the mark of a gas station
operating exclusively within one state. More recently, the Ninth
Circuit held that a single interstate shipment of an aerosol can was
sufficient to vest jurisdiction under the Lanham Act.4' Similarly,
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have long treated use in commerce as
essentially a jurisdictional requirement. 3
37 See infra text accompanying notes 39-45.
38 "It thus appears that the distinction between the ownership of a trade-mark, and the
right of registration, must not be confused.. . . Ownership is a condition precedent to regis-
tration, while use in interstate commerce is essential to confer upon Congress constitutional
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the act." Macaulay v. Malt-Diastase Co., 4 F.2d 944,
945 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
" United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
40 See Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964); Lyon v. Quality Courts United, 249 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1957);
Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888
(1954); Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942); Miles Laboratories, Inc, v.
Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
41 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942).
42 Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 907 (1964). Appellants sent one can of PROMISE with the label appropriately
attached from Los Angeles to New York. Thus, it was "transported in commerce" and the
district court had jurisdiction of the trademark infringement claim. Id. at 93.
43 See Lyon v. Quality Courts United, 249 F.2d 790, 795 (6th Cir. 1957); Pure Foods, Inc,
v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 795-96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954); cf.
Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256, 257-58 (S.D. Cal. 1961) ("[a] single
actual sale or use by defendant in another state would be sufficient interstate commerce to
[Vol. 19:233
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That use in commerce is minimal is not really a matter of trade-
mark law. It is nothing more than standard black letter, if there is
such a thing, constitutional law. For over forty years the Supreme
Court has held that the required contacts with interstate com-
merce that are sufficient to trigger commerce clause powers are
minimal.4" This limited contact clearly applies to trademark law.
Any minimal, even token, use is probably sufficient to trigger fed-
eral jurisdiction. In fact, there does not seem to be any legal doc-
trine that would invalidate collusive, sham, or contrived transac-
tions as sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction, as long as the
transactions are sufficiently interstate in nature or effect.
In other words, use in (interstate) commerce is a token require-
ment, especially in today's virtually unitary national marketplace.
In the trademark context, any intrastate activity sufficient to give
ownership of a trademark would be the kind of activity that would
have arguable interstate effects. The conclusion is inescapable,
then, that the use in commerce requirement requires only a token
use.4 5 A collusive act, a sham act, or a commercially empty act
should suffice, because whatever its underlying commercial sub-
stance, the transaction has the interstate significance required by
the Constitution.
Use in trade, on the other hand, is required because Congress
has statutorily mandated that before an applicant can gain regis-
tration to a mark, he must "own" it,4" and trademark ownership
requires that the applicant first have used the mark in trade-that
is, as a trademark. Use in trade is thus a substantive, not a proce-
dural, requirement. Its distinctive and substantive character, com-
pared to use in commerce, was recognized when the issue was first
raised years ago.47 Courts have jealously (and the adverb is no ex-
aggeration here) maintained a profoundly sharp distinction be-
give federal protection under the Act").
"' Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
4"See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982) (specifying what transactions satisfy the
trademark use in commerce requirement).
4"See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. For a description of how to establish and
maintain rights in a trademark, see Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice and Protec-
tion, 4 GA. L REv. 322 (1970); see also Lunsford, Trademarks and Semantics: The Use and
Misuse of Trademarks in Dictionaries and Trade Journals, 6 GA. L RMv. 311 (1972)
(describing how trade journals and dictionaries have undermined the use of trademarks).
" See, e.g., Macaulay v. Malt-Diastase Co., 4 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
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tween the two uses.48 The essence of trade use has thus always
been held substantial. The exact nature of its substance lies in the
developed identification of the mark with the product in the eyes
of the consuming public. Before an applicant for registration can
claim to own a mark, she must have successfully marketed the
product to such an extent that a significant portion of the public
identifies the mark with the product.49
Thus, state common law uniformly determines trademark own-
ership. One must actually use a device as a trademark to gain own-
ership of the mark. This actual use in trade is and has always been
the hallmark of trademark ownership. One cannot obtain owner-
ship of a trademark by merely creating the mark nor desiring to
exclude others from potential use of the trademark. Neither can
one gain ownership through token use, sham transaction, or pre-
arranged "sales"-although any of those transactions probably are
sufficient to satisfy use in commerce. In other words, the intent to
use a trademark is irrelevant; only use in trade secures ownership.
To summarize, before a person can apply for federal registration
of a mark, she must satisfy two "use" requirements. The potential
applicant must first use the mark in connection with goods or ser-
vices so that the mark comes to identify and distinguish the goods
or services in the appropriate market environment. Next, almost
inevitably concurrently, she must satisfy the constitutional re-
quirement that her transactions have interstate significance. Only
then can the applicant truthfully state under oath, prior to regis-
tration as the statute requires, 0 that she both owns the mark and
uses it in interstate commerce.
48
The right to a trade-mark exists independently of the statute. Registration simply
constitutes prima facie evidence that the registrant is entitled to the mark. The
trade-mark statute does not define what constitutes a trade-mark. We must go to the
common law for that.
"The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally the growth of a
considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. * * * The exclusive
right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption."
.. . The trader must apply the mark to a vendible commodity and "must actually
put the commodity so marked on the market."
Phillips v. Hudnut, 263 F. 643, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
9 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
50 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1982).
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B. The Successful Administrative-Judicial Assault
Nevertheless, courts have confused the two uses and, with the
indispensable help of a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board sympa-
thetic to the demands of marketers, have developed a token use
doctrine that combines both use in trade and use in commerce.
Modern token use is a doctrine of collapsed trademark use that
developed through a slow process of confusion. The doctrine made
a stillborn appearance in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp.1 but not until Standard Pressed Steel v. Midwest
Chrome Process Co.52 was it articulated in its mature form, the
Board holding that, for use in trade, "a token sale or a single ship-
ment in commerce may be sufficient... notwithstanding that the
evidence may not show what disposition was made of the product
so shipped. '5 3
The Board, however, ruled that internal shipments were insuffi-
cient. It initially seems strange that the Board would approve to-
ken sales but bar internal shipments. If a transaction need only be
token, there is no reason why, having thus approved transactions
without substance, any restrictions would be necessary. But the
Board had to "harmonize" cases that had addressed two funda-
mentally different and profoundly unrelated doctrines: use in trade
and use in commerce. In reconciling the two, it used the language
of use in commerce while defining use in trade. When the Board in
Standard Pressed Steel collapsed those two doctrines, it was left
with some clear limits from earlier trade use cases that had to be
accommodated within the new collapsed rule based on use in com-
merce. This was easily, though awkwardly, done by articulating a
rule of token use derived from use in commerce, adding a formalis-
tic exception: no intracompany transactions allowed, since the
cases most clearly and flatly prohibiting token use could also,
though awkwardly, be re-categorized under that rubric.
The Board thus unblushingly articulated a doctrine that col-
lapsed trade and commerce use. This new collapsed doctrine con-
tains two radical opportunities favoring trademark registrants.
First, the truly token sale, one that is a paper transaction masquer-
5- 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 607 (TTAB), affd, 390 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1966). For a discussion
of the Fort Howard opinion, see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
52 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 758 (TTAB 1974).
Id. at 764 (emphasis supplied).
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ading as a commercial event (but no intracompany transactions al-
lowed!), is not subject to any examination since the ultimate dispo-
sition of the product is irrelevant. Second, and even more
important, one need not even make a sale to gain registration-a
shipment is enough. This is more than a synthesis of prior rules: it
is a disappearance of use in trade into use in commerce, a substitu-
tion of one rule for another.
More shocking, however, is the reason given by the Board for its
new rule:
It has been recognized and especially so in the last few years
that, in view of the expenditures involved in introducing a
new product on the market generally and the attendant risk
involved therein prior to the screening process involved in
resorting to the federal registration system and in the absence
of the existence of an "intent to use" statute, a token sale or a
single shipment in commerce may be sufficient to support an
application . . . notwithstanding that the evidence may not
show what disposition was made of the product so shipped.
5 4
This is, essentially, Howard's complaint: you can't take blood from
a stone.
Despite the fact that no date of birth can be assigned to the col-
lapse of the doctrine, it is easy to spot the defects in its pedigree.
In Standard Pressed Steel, the new doctrine was based on four
cases.55 The following brief examination of those cases demon-
strates that the new Board doctrine represents a radical departure
from prior law.
In the first case, Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Maternity Shop,
Inc.,5e the court favored a doctrine of minimal use, relying upon
two earlier cases. Both those cases did articulate a doctrine of min-
imal use, but only in connection with use in commerce!
I Id. For a similar rationale articulated by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, see
infra note 65.
5 Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956); West.
ern Stove Co. v. Geo. D. Roper Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Fort Howard
Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 390 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 F.2d 842 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
57 See Worden v. Cannaliato, 285 F. 988 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 F.2d 842 (C.C.P.A. 1931). Worden stated that "a single instance of
use" suffices. 285 F. at 990. Ward effectively approved collusive uses. See 49 F.2d at 844.
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In the second case, Western Stove Co. v. Geo. D. Roper Corp.,5 8
a single use was approved but it was clear that the single use had
to be a genuine commercial transaction. Furthermore, the court re-
lied upon precedent that had only approved such sales made "in
good faith."5 9 Thus, the decision in Western Stove merely repeated
accepted trademark law that ownership does not derive from any
particular amount of use but rather from a genuinely commercial
and substantial transaction in which the mark is involved in actual
trade.6 0
Similarly, the third case, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.,"1 explicitly distinguished two sales. One was an ac-
tual sale in which the trademark was part of the transaction-the
customer requested the product by name-but the transaction was
wholly intrastate. Another, later, transaction was arranged by the
registrant and was interstate. Its status as an actual "sale" was
questionable. The court approved both sales, making it clear that
the difference between use in trade and use in commerce is that
the first, being substantive, has to be commercially valid while the
second, being merely procedural, can permissibly be less than a
bona fide commercial transaction.
Finally, the court in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp.2 did not approve noncommercial transactions for use in
trade, but held only that the motives of a sale would not invalidate
it. The case approved a minimal sale, 3 finding that the fact that
the sale was "made expressly for [federal] registration purposes is
not damning, per se." On the other hand, two features of Fort
Note that though Ward effectively approves sham transactions for use in commerce, Stan-
dard Pressed Steel did not, because the Board had to accommodate a number of other cases
to reach its result.
80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
59 California Spray-Chemical Corp. v. Ansbacher Siegle Corp., 55 US.P.Q. (BNA) 298
(Comm'r 1942).
60 On the other hand, Western Stove did state, hypothetically, that had the trademark
act been applicable, a different measure of use might have been appropriate. 80 U.S.P.Q. at
401-02.
61 49 F.2d 842 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
62 390 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals opinion does not state the amount,
the Board's opinion indicates that the sale was for only $1.91. Fort Howard Paper Co. v.
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Howard are troubling. The minimal amount of the transaction
raises the possibility of token trademark use. Although the court
held that motivation was not a determining factor, its disregard of
the amount as an important issue invited later cases to view the
opinion as effectively reducing use in trade to a trivial concept.
Equally troubling, however, is that Fort Howard specifically noted
the difficulties of marketing as a factor militating in favor of ac-
cepting the minimal use involved in the transaction.""
In spite of these caveats, Fort Howard does not support the deci-
sion in Standard Pressed Steel, which dismissed the need for any
real sales transaction as the required trademark use. And, interest-
ingly, Fort Howard rested upon the same line of cases as Standard
Pressed Steel with one exception. The additional case only re-
peated the traditional common law doctrine requiring sales to be
made in good faith.6
The only defensible support for the new doctrine is the empirical
observation that any more substantial requirement would burden
mass marketers. The token use in trade doctrine has been repeated
so often by the Board that it now appears to be accepted doc-
trine.67 For example, in Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Sut-
cliffe,6 s the Board repeated its concern for the difficulties market-
ers face in securing ownership of trademarks:
[I]n view of the expense in introducing a new product on the
market on any scale and the risk attached thereto prior to the
screening practice involved in seeking federal registration, a
token sale or a single shipment of the product bearing the
trademark in question in commerce may be sufficient ..
65
[l]t normally takes ... about three years after adoption and first use of a new mark
to take the necessary steps leading to national distribution of a product under it ....
We think it appropriate that appellee should proceed with cautiop to try out its right
to registration ... before plunging into the market with more extensive sales than it
did.
390 F.2d at 1017.
" California Spray-Chemical Corp. v. Ansbacher Siegle Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 298
(Comm'r 1942). The good faith requirement was also present in the cases supporting West-
ern Stove.
V See supra note 22.
68 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656 (TTAB 1979).
69 Id. at 662.
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Obvious shortcomings in the doctrine have been bolstered with a
veneer of qualifications.7" Apparently recognizing that token use is
vulnerable to the claim that it favors established marketers over
new entrants,71 the Board attempted to support the doctrine by
emphasizing a requirement that appears nowhere in the Lanham
Act:
The term "bona fide" as commonly understood, means
"good faith". . . . Translated to the context in which it is
used herein, the term would indicate that the initial shipment
should not be contrived or fabricated but rather it should be
open and notorious and made as a part of a commercial or
related transaction directed to customers or potential custom-
ers .... 72
Lost in the discussion, however, was the recognition of use in com-
merce as separate from use in trade. Moreover, the common law
requirement of bona fide use was never addressed to the motive of
the marketer but to the response of the market, 3 a factor-the
key factor of trademark use-that the new collapsed doctrine has
conspicuously excluded.74
More recently, in In re Cedar Point, Inc.,75 the Board denied
registration of a service that had been advertised but not yet ren-
70 The most notable qualifications gilding the doctrine are concepts of good faith and
continuing use, discussed infra text accompanying notes 71-72 & 117-19.
71 Established marketers are advantaged by the doctrine because, among other reasons,
(1) they can build up vast "stables" of already protected trademarks ready for use at a
moment's notice, (2) they can, through their greater economic resources, afford to focus
those resources on the already protected mark rather than the product, which a new entrant
may well have succeeded in making better or cheaper, and (3) they have probably perfected
skills at marketing marks, as opposed to products, skills which, in a free market unperverted
by a trademark system rewarding token use would, and should, be economically irrelevant.
72 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656, 662 (TTAB 1979).
'3 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 F.2d 842, 843 (C.C.P,.A 1931).
The court noted that the purchaser "learned in some way-we do not regard it as material
just how-" of the applicant's merchandise. Id. What was material was the identification of
the mark with the goods. Montgomery Ward must be read carefully to avoid confusion since
the case discusses both use in trade and use in commerce.
74 In fact, earlier in the opinion, the Board stated: "The cotistructive use date or filing
date is obviously bottomed on the fact that there was, at the very least, a bona fide use of
the mark in commerce prior to the filing of the application." Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.
v. Sutcliffe, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656, 662 (TTAB 1979). The Board proceeded to treat that
use "in commerce" as the sole relevant use required, thus collapsing both uses into one.
711 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 533 (TTAB 1983).
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dered. For use in commerce purposes, however, there was clearly
enough use since an effect on interstate commerce was more than
evident in the case. The denial, therefore, had to be based on a
lack of use in trade. The Board did not deny the application be-
cause of the lack of a sale (after all, sales are not required any
more under Standard Pressed Steel), but simply because the ser-
vices were not actually rendered.
However, the services-an amusement park ride-were seasonal
and could not be rendered until summer. The Board was unwilling
to examine the legitimate focus of trade use: whether the applicant
had succeeded in developing an identification between the mark
and the service. This is unsurprising because such an inquiry
would have undermined the new collapsed use doctrine, which ef-
fectively forbids such an inquiry on pain of discovering its illegiti-
mate basis. A rule requiring a developed identification between the
mark and the goods or services would have invalidated most of the
token use cases in which the Board had invested so much of its
integrity. Thus, the opinion did not examine whether the applicant
had developed a connection between "potential customers," in the
words of Times Mirror,7 6 and the mark, which further illustrates
that the substance of use in trade has been lost with the advent of
the new collapsed trademark use doctrine.
In Visa International Service Association v. Life-Code Systems,
Inc.," the Board approved a registration of a mark for a scheme to
market a device like a credit card containing a traveler's medical
and passport information. Registration was approved largely on
the basis of the "open and notorious nature of applicant's other
promotional activities," despite a confidentiality clause in those ac-
tivities that preceded registration.78 The only activities, however,
that were arguably open and notorious all occurred subsequent to
the application and were therefore irrelevant to the ownership re-
quired of any federal registrant prior to registration. Furthermore,
they were all promotional activities functionally identical to the
advertising that the Board rejected as insufficient in Cedar Point.
What made Visa International different is that one card had been
sold a few days after the applicant conceived of the idea for the
76 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656, 662 (TTAB 1979).
77 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 740 (TTAB 1983).
71 Id. at 744.
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commercial enterprise. The transparency of that one sale, however,
is made clear by the facts: the single card was sold over a week
before the applicant ever publicized his product. It defies common
sense to imply that a true trade relationship can be established
through the sale of only one product when the product could only
succeed with mass marketing. 9 Clearly the one card would have
satisfied use in commerce if it had been an interstate transaction.
But to allow registration on the basis of the one card demonstrates
the collapse that has occurred after Standard Pressed Steel.
The token use cases fly in the face of established law. None
comes close to requiring use in trade "sufficiently public" to de-
velop identity in any "segment of the public mind."80 Neither does
the new collapsed doctrine ensure any "public exposure" that
would have the least "impact on the purchasing public." 81 Nor
does it mandate any "usage" that would "create an association in
the mind of the consuming public. '82 Finally, there is no assurance
that a mark to be registered has "become popularized in the public
mind as identifying the product of the user thereof. '83 Clearly, the
Board has created out of the Lanham Act an effective intent-to-use
statute, despite, or perhaps because of, its occasional lip service to
the outlines of the traditional doctrine of use in trade.8' In effect,
the new collapsed rule has raised the ante on use in commerce-no
longer can it be truly token in order to trigger the federal jurisdic-
tional requirement-but has lowered it for use in trade-a ship-
ment, rather than a sale, is now sufficient as long as it is "open...
notorious and . . . directed to . . . potential customers."88
The new doctrine appears to be more "well liked" than any pre-
vious trademark doctrine. Even courts that are obviously wary of it
are reluctant to reject it. 8 For instance, in Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah
79 The applicant conducted a later mass mailing to over 19,000 travel agents and con-
tacted all newspapers with circulations over 100,000.
80 New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 1951).
81 Old Swiss House, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc, 569 F.2d 1130, 1133 (C.CP.A. 1978).
" Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc., 579 F.2d 75, 79 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
" Martha White Foods v. Western Grain Co., 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299, 300 (TTAB 1969),
affd sub nom. Jim Dandy Co. v. Martha White Foods, 458 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
See id. at 300-01.
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Sutcliffe, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656, 662 (TTAB 1979).
"Just as token use depends upon an appearance of judicial legitimacy, Willy Loman
believed that appearance, not substance, was key to both life and the market.
Willy. Bernard can get the best marks in school, y'understand, but when he gets
1985]
HeinOnline  -- 19 Ga. L. Rev. 257 1984-1985
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Manufacturing Co. 87 the court went to great, but ultimately inef-
fective, lengths to distinguish and limit Standard Pressed Steel.
The court did not have the nerve to raise the price of trademark
ownership. It was eventually reduced to describing and allowing
the agency's clearly substantive change in trademark law as only a
change of procedure. "The decision may demonstrate a reversal of
the presumption that ownership rights precede registration rights,
but it does not affect our analysis of common law use in trade." 88
Blue Bell, rather than reject or even limit the radical doctrine es-
poused in Standard Pressed Steel, instead further legitimized it by
offering an acceptable mode by which to define it: it was simply a
procedural device.
This process by which administrative doctrine becomes en-
shrined rather than reviewed at the appellate level has a slightly
comical cast (perhaps more as black humor than anything else),
especially when considering the path from Standard Pressed Steel
to Blue Bell. Standard Pressed Steel essentially created a doctrine
out of whole cloth. Although it cited cases as precedent, the only
arguably relevant case was Fort Howard. But Fort Howard was a
review of an earlier Board decision that had been authored by the
same administrative judge who then wrote the decision in Stan-
dard Pressed Steel, reinterpreting the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals affirmance of his earlier Board decision in a way that
allowed him to articulate the new collapsed doctrine in its mature
form. As the federal appellate decision that essentially sanitized
Standard Pressed Steel, Blue Bell completes the circle. In other
out in the business world, y'understand, you are going to be five times ahead of him.
...Because the man who makes an appearance in the business world, the man who
creates personal interest is the man who gets ahead. Be liked and you will never want.
Death of a Salesman, supra note 1, at 146.
Willy: That's just the way I'm bringing them up, Ben-rugged, well liked, all.
around.
Id. at 157.
Willy: It's not what you say, it's how you say it-because personality always wins
the day.
Id. at 169.
Willy: [T]he sky's the limit, because it's not what you do, Ben. It's who you know
and the smile on your face! It's contacts, Ben, contacts! ... [T]hat's the wonder of
this country, that man can end with diamonds here on the basis of being likedl
Id. at 184.
87 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).
88 Id. at 1266-67.
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words, the seeds of Standard Pressed Steel were planted by the
same panel in Fort Howard. Cultivated by Standard Pressed
Steel, those seeds have now flowered, thanks to the assistance of
the Fifth Circuit in Blue Bell.
C. The Unsuccessful, but Unnecessary, Legislative Assault
Although the courts have illegitimately read a substantial use in
trade requirement out of the Lanham Act, Congress could, if it
wished, grant trademark rights for token use. In fact there have
been vigorous lobbying efforts to enact an intent-to-use statute.
Under modern commerce clause doctrine, Congress has broad
enough powers, if it is necessary, to authorize registration of marks
which are insufficiently used to be owned under the common law.
That is, the commerce power is strong enough to create substan-
tive trademark rights, if Congress wishes,89 as it has done in the
areas of constructive notice and incontestability.
But with respect to ownership Congress has made no such
changes, and it is trademark ownership that is the focus of the
trademark use doctrine. If Congress merely intended, as it did in
the Lanham Act, to furnish registration (liberal registration, to be
sure, under modern commerce clause requirements) to marks al-
ready owned by applicants, it is illegitimate to confuse the minimal
requirement of use in commerce sufficient to trigger federal juris-
diction with the substantial use in trade required by common law
for ownership purposes. With respect to use, although the situation
might have changed and Congress could have effected such
changes, it did not. Therefore, articulated doctrines of trademark
use that preceded the Lanham Act are as viable today as fifty
years ago. 0
The intensity of the efforts to enact intent-to-use statutes is sig-
nificant for two reasons. First, it reveals how business groups and
their legal servants, the trademark bar, highly value the benefits to
be derived from such a modification of the Lanham Act. Second, it
" In S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 860 (1949), Judge Hand recognized that the Lanham Act "put federal trade-mark law
upon a new footing ... and created rights uniform throughout the Union, in the interpreta-
tion of which we are not limited by local law." Id. at 178; see also Burger King, Inc. v.
Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968) (Congress intended that once a federal trademark certif-
icate is issued, no other person can acquire a superior right).
90 See Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1974).
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demonstrates, if only by negative implication, that the Lanham
Act as written does not include any intent-to-use provisions. The
legislative history states that the Act was designed to offer busi-
nesspersons protection for the good will of ventures "which they
have built up," not which they merely intend to build up. 1 The
Senate comments indicate that the Act was drafted to protect
trademarks for reasons of equity and fairness by giving protection
to those who, by first investing their own resources in developing a
mark, have fulfilled their part of the bargain. "[W]here the owner
of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting
to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-estab-
lished rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark
owner."
92
The number of attempts to modify the Act with intent-to-use
provisions are legion. 3 Most have never even been reported out of
committee nor apparently passed either house of Congress. Yet,
the supporters both within and without Congress have been ex-
tremely powerful and voluble. Senator Everett Dirksen lent his
name to what is probably the best-known effort94 and the trade-
mark bar has not hesitated to contribute unblushingly its good
name. 5 The Dirksen Bill was studied, revised, and eventually sup-
ported by the Chicago Bar Association Special Trademark Com-
mittee, the American Bar Association Committee, and the Na-
tional Coordinating Committee and Lawyers' Advisory Committee
91 S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONO, & AD, NEWS
1274, 1276.
2 Id. at 3.
93 For a list of articles and legislation, see Whittredge, supra note 31, at 883 n.1; see also
March, Intention to Use-1938-1963 (con), 53 TRADE-MARK REP. 984, 990 (1963).
" See Note, Intent to Use Bill, 54 TRADE-MARK REP. 439 (1964).
91 The trademark bar is specialized and relatively discrete. See infra text accompanying
notes 104, 106 & 139-41. It routinely lobbies both legislatively and judicially for whatever
change-or stasis-that tends to preserve or expand the trademark monopoly. For a recent
episode in the continuing drama of the trademark bar's uninterrupted interest in protecting
established marketers at the expense of new entrants, see the brief of the United States
Trademark Association petitioning to appear as amicus in the "Anti-Monopoly" case. Dris-
col & Robin, Excerpts From the United States Trademark Association's Motion in the
United States Supreme Court For Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petition for Certiorari in CPG Products Corp. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc.
(The "Anti-Monopoly" Case), 72 TRADE-MARK RE'. 549 (1982).
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to the United States Trademark Association." In fact, it appears
that the proposed legislation was drafted by those lobbying groups
and introduced by Senator Dirksen "at the request of" those
groups.97 The politically astute might marvel that these efforts
have been for naught. Their lack of legislative success, however,
can hardly be termed a "failure" in view of the administrative/ju-
dicial success of the collapsed doctrine of trademark use already
described.
Also, the few writers who have questioned intent-to-use propos-
als are more likely to damn the present system with rather faint
praise than to bluntly oppose the proposals. That is, articles that
oppose intent-to-use statutes are not so much opposed to liberal
use doctrines as they are to changing an already friendly climate
that makes such proposals unnecessary. In one of the few articles
that seems unalterably opposed to intent-to-use legislation, the ob-
jection seems based more on expedience than on any commitment
to free competition:
Abrogation of our common law of trademarks, which has
stood the test of time, in favor of legislation granting rights to
a mark based upon intention to use involves serious disadvan-
tages which it is believed will more than offset any fleeting
advantage and will be to the detriment of our leading corpora-
tions and new business enterprises.98
In other words, one cannot find spokespersons for the public inter-
est, commentators who question the legitimacy of expanded trade-
mark monopolies.99 Those opposed to the intent-to-use standard
commonly find it meddlesome but not necessarily illegitimate.100
The only article that opposes intent-to-use on constitutional
grounds nevertheless relies largely on reasons of expedience. 101 The
leading recent article opposed to intent-to-use proposals concludes
by regretfully noting the superfluous and perhaps needlessly sub-
" 111 CONG. REc. 17,708 (1965).
9 Whittredge, supra note 31, at 883.
98 March, supra note 93, at 989.
"See infra text accompanying note 106. The Fletcher article, however, does implicitly
observe that the trademark bar, as an entity, has no interest in competitive antimonopolistic
trademark doctrines. See Fletcher, supra note 31, at 350.
100 See Van Santen, supra note 8, at 223.
101 March, supra note 93, at 988-89.
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versive effect such a change might have upon "public
confidence." '102
That note of regret at the thought of drastic and perhaps unnec-
essary action is reminiscent of Willy Loman's funeral in the re-
quiem scene in Death of a Salesman:
Happy, deeply angered: He had no right to do that. There
was no necessity for it. We would've helped him.
Linda: . . . I don't understand it. Why did you ever do
that? . . . I search and search and I search, and I can't under-
stand it, Willy. I made the last payment on the house today.
Today, dear. And there'll be nobody home."'
There is "no necessity" for an intent-to-use statute because of
the present practice of warehousing trademarks, a practice made
possible by token use. The practice is openly discussed by the
trademark bar literature, which details trademark abuse, trade-
mark maintenance programs, and the development of trademark
"stables" as a usual and accepted practice by both marketers and
the Patent and Trademark Office.104
One writer has suggested, on the basis of empirical research, that
for every registered trademark being used there are at least four
being warehoused by marketers. 05 Others gamely seem to think
102 See Howes, The Case Against Intention to Use, 51 TRADE-MARK REP. 242 (1961). He
states:
Thus a token use, in the ordinary sense of the word, which as I understand it,
encompasses good faith, followed by continued use constitutes orthodox common law
trademark acquiring procedure. Both the existing law and the proposal contemplate
continued use to sustain validity .... The policy question the business community
has to decide, therefore, is which procedure is more likely to result in maintaining or
strengthening public confidence in trademarks and which is more susceptible to
abuse.
Id. at 251. The author's implied requirement of good faith, however, is illusory. All token
uses are presumptively in good faith unless there is evidence of "bad faith, lack of intent to
continue, fraudulent purpose or some other ground for a claim of illegality." Id.
103 Death of a Salesman, supra note 1, at 221-22.
104 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 31, at 336 ("Applications, and affidavits of use, are
cheerfully signed and filed, and registrations of these marks are obtained and maintained.
Some companies maintain rosters of dozens of such little-used marks, awaiting the product
and market to fit them.").
105 Kegan, supra note 8, at 180: "There is a disparity, therefore, between the commercial
use theoretically expected under the Lanham Act and the token use supporting some of the
Lanham Act registrations. Yet many trademark registrants will maintain all their registra-
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that by admitting this open secret it can be legitimized. As one
confessed, when marketers are unable to register a mark because
use of the mark on a commercial basis is still months away, "we all
turn to token use as the only solution .... There is nothing illegal
about this. There is nothing furtive or uncommon about it. We all
do it, and everyone knows it's done. But there is something faintly
contrived about it all. ' 10 6 The phenomenon has been noted judi-
cially as well, though less enthusiastically.10 7 Judging from the at-
tempts and comments in support of the intent-to-use proposal, and
even some opposing it, there is no doubt that those who favor the
interests of business view the intent-to-use standard as
advantageous."' o
D. Collateral Issues
1. Section 45. Nothing has confused the trademark use prob-
lem more than section 45 of the Lanham Act, which defines use in
commerce."' 9 Since it is the only statutory section which directly
tions "just in case" commercialization of the trademarked item may be desirable."106 Whittredge, supra note 31, at 885-86.
107 See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 102 (5th Cir. 1983).
108 Burger King, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968), implicitly notes a far more
clever way by which marketing interests could accomplish their goal without the distortion
that trademark use doctrine has caused. The Burger King decision recognizes that it is pos-
sible for the state legislature to change the state common law of trademarks by statute. This
approach potentially includes abolishing or at least radically altering use in trade as a pre-
requisite to ownership. If that were accomplished in one receptive state, federal registration
would automatically follow, since the Lanham Act relegates trademark ownership to state
law. Marketers desiring a de facto intent-to-use federal scheme could then take advantage of
registration within that one state to gain nationwide rights through Lanham Act registra-
tion. Why this has not been done is somewhat mysterious, except that similar efforts to
expand state trademark law have been limited by state courts using narrow methods of
statutory interpretation. On the other hand, the explanation may simply lie in a mistaken
assumption that such an approach would not work. The only reference in the trademark
literature that even tangentially addresses this method is mistaken. See 3 R. CALLmAN. THE
LAw OF UNFAIR CobMsP moN, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 19.06 (L Altman, 4th ed.
1983). Callmann cites Holsum Bakeries, Inc. v. General Baking Co., 228 F. Supp. 962 (EJ.
La. 1964), for the proposition that "[a] registration under state law which is allowed without
prior use is no substitute for use." Yet Holsum says nothing of the sort, instead holding the
Lanham Act "inapplicable" to its decision and that Louisiana law required actual use for an
enforceable trademark. Id. at 963.
109 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
[A] mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce (a) on goods when it is placed in
any manner on the goods or their containers on the displays associated therewith or
on the tags or labels affixed thereto and the goods are sold or transported in com-
merce and (b) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
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addresses the question of "use," courts have tended to rely on it as
the solution to all their trademark use issues. The problem, how-
ever, is that the section defines use in commerce. It does not even
address, let alone define, the requirement of use in trade. Natu-
rally, courts that confuse or collapse the two requirements have
interpreted section 45 to authorize a token use in commerce (which
it probably does) and, finding no other section to answer their
'questions regarding use in trade, then assume it also authorizes a
token use in trade (which it certainly does not). In Louis Rich, Inc.
v. Horace W. Longacre, Inc.,110 the court used section 45, which
simply requires some minimal interstate use for registration pur-
poses, to uphold a questionable instance of what even the court
termed use "as a trademark."'
Similarly, in Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 12 the court
recognized that a "minimal amount" of commerce suffices for re-
gistration, then inexplicably excluded "sham transactions exclu-
sively designed to do so. ' 113 Finally the court imposed two addi-
tional requirements of "bona fide" use and "an accompanying
intent to engage in continuing commercial use in the future." It
bottomed all of these requirements upon section 45, which simply
defines use in commerce for purposes of registration, and which
says nothing about substantial use, intent, or any of the other indi-
cia of trademark ownership arguably relevant to use in trade.
Other courts, however, have correctly understood section 45 to be a
jurisdictional section.1 1 4
An additional problem is section 45's definition of service mark
use in commerce. 1 5 Because services cannot be rendered with a
trade device attached, the inclusion of service marks within the
Lanham Act required an elaboration, and perhaps even a liberali-
zation, of the concept of use in commerce to allow service mark
services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered In
more than one State or in this and a foreign country and the person rendering the
services is engaged in commerce in connection therewith.
Id.
110 423 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
m Id. at 1336.
497 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1974).
' Id. at 437.
'z, In re Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F.2d 806 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. John-
son & Sons, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). For the text of the provision, see supra note 109.
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registration. The definition of use in commerce for service marks
was amended in 1962 in an effort, which was only partially success-
ful, to clarify the problem. The service use definition has tended,
in a way similar to the goods use section preceding it, to confuse
courts that seek solutions in clear statutory terms. The language
was meant to liberalize use in commerce, not use in trade. Inter-
preted to liberalize use in trade, it becomes anomalous because
there is no reason to suppose that Congress wished to allow owner-
ship of trademarks for services under circumstances that would be
insufficient for trademarks for goods. Use in trade of a service
mark must be physically different for the reason that, just as in
use in commerce, the device cannot be attached to the service. But
the development of the mark's identity among a consuming public
should be no different. The cases that inject this issue into the
trademark use problem are just needlessly confusing the issues.'"
2. Continuing Use. Continuing use is another source of unnec-
essary confusion. Continuing use has always been a requirement to
maintain already established ownership. 17 It is thus a way to avoid
a claim of abandonment. Cases wrestling with the precariously bot-
tomed token use rule, though, have used the requirement of con-
tinuing use to bolster the rule.118 Like section 45, however, the con-
tinuing use doctrine was designed not to establish ownership but
rather to preserve an already secured title. Even then, the bare in-
tent to continue use-and any continuing intent to do so-is
irrelevant.119
III JURISPRUDENTIAL EXPLANATIONS: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PARRY
In an area noted for its excessive formalism, 20 the collapsed doc-
trine of trademark use has a realistic, even a neo-realistic, gloss.
But, strictly speaking, collapsed use has no support in formalism,
realism, nor even in the theory of "institutional competence." 2 '
116 See Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc., 579 F.2d 75 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Gas-
town, Inc., 326 F.2d 780 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
" Western Stove Co. v. Geo. D. Roper Corp., 82 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
118 Li'l Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98, 102 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Visa
Int'l Service Ass'n v. Life-Code Sys., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 740, 744 (TTAB 1983).
11' See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983).
120 See McClure, supra note 23, at 316-26.
121 See H. HART & A. SACHs. THE LEGAL PROcEs& BASic PROBLEMS IN THE MAKNG AND
APPLCATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
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That is, the rule of trademark use has been developed in a heavy-
A brief excursus through twentieth century legal history and jurisprudence may make the
text more comprehensible, especially because most trademark literature-McClure's piece,
supra note 23, is a major exception-generally proceeds as if trademark law has developed
in an historical and jurisprudential vacuum. The assumption seems to be that not much,
either jurisprudentially or historically, has happened.
The twentieth century, however, has been the scene of perhaps the most rapidly changing
jurisprudential drama that legal history has ever witnessed. The nineteenth century era of
legal formalism-in which legal concepts were treated as if they were scientific axioms with
a meaning and content of their own-had ended. The new century was to be dominated by
legal realism, which encouraged jurists and lawyers to recognize that law and its rules had
little, if any, inherent content. Legal realism emphasized the sociological, psychological, eco-
nomic, and linguistic factors that were assumed to be the true source of legal meaning. Be-
sides a new, realistic view of the law, legal realism also offered to courts as well as legisla-
tures an opportunity for legal reform. If law had no real, inherent content, the realists
proclaimed, there should be no bar to massive changes and reinterpretations of law, even
statutory law, by common law courts. All that was necessary was an informed understanding
of law's true basis-such as sociology, psychology, and economics. Even trademark law
should not have been immune to this new look at law's nature.
But, as the twentieth century progressed, the law, bereft of its formalistic and moralistic
foundations, was perceived to be potentially directionless. Justice had its roots not in any
transcendent notions of morality but in the shifting needs of the moment. Lawyers and
jurists, left with a highly realistic self-image, perhaps, but without any fixed, let alone tran-
scendentally eternal, source for guidance, became uncertain, insecure, and downright scared.
This was especially true after Nazism and Fascism seemed to demonstrate the ends to which
amoral realism could lead. See infra note 125. See generally E. PURCELL, THE CnISIS oF
DEiOCRATIC THEORY (1973).
In the mid 1950's, the theory of institutional competence came to the rescue. See H. HART
& A. SACHS, supra. Its answer was that while law may have had no root in morality, its
procedural and institutional character gave it an identifiable nature, integrity, and legiti-
macy. Legal procedures could redeem legal substance. Judicial activity had its own legiti-
macy which could be found in legal procedures-things like equality, notice, considered
judgment, and reasoned explanations-as long as it was restricted to the judicial arena.
McClure's observation was this: trademark law could have been altered, by courts, to re-
spond to the realist perception that trademarks monopolized not just the marks but also the
markets. Realism's offer, however, was blunted by the arrival of the institutional compe-
tence "gambit," as McClure termed it. The institutional source of the Lanham Act
-Congress-was the institution most competent to alter its substance, and thus courts were
discouraged from acting upon relevant economic information.
My point is that the institutional competence gambit was not sufficient to protect all, or
at least the most greedy of, the demands of marketers. Institutional competence could in-
deed protect them from a radical realistic re-reading of the Lanham Act. But it could not,
by definition, relieve them of what the words of the Act said: that trademark use, both in
commerce and in trade, was prerequisite to registration. The maturation of administrative
law, what I call the administrative parry, allowed them even that last bit of greed. Institu-
tional competence prevented the courts from changing the statute, but agencies, which were
neither courts nor legislatures, were poorly addressed by that theory and were relatively free
to act in their clients' interests. The administrative parry allowed the gutting of trademark
use.
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handed way to satisfy marketing interests without even paying lip
service to any of the jurisprudential schools that would provide at
least facial validity. Specifically, the collapsed doctrine of trade-
mark use could have been justified by characterizing the interest of
marketers as "property." Such a formalistic approach would have
the advantage to its authors, at least, of foreclosing further serious
challenge. Instead, token use has been justified through a bastard-
ized legal realism that simply relies upon the supposed expense of
alternatives to marketers. But this falls far short of the sophisti-
cated economic analysis that would justify the doctrine under the-
ories of legal realism.122
In his powerful, comprehensive article, Daniel McClure attrib-
uted the static nature of modern trademark law to the "institu-
tional competence and political question gambits."1 2 3
The history of trademark doctrine since passage of the Lan-
ham Act is basically the story of how the legal realist revolu-
tion never arrived. The effect of the Lanham Act was essen-
tially to freeze common law doctrine in the form it had taken
since the turn of the century. The application of the Act's
provisions by courts has generally been formalistic. The doc-
trinal solutions to the monopoly versus protection problem
which had been developed at common law have been adopted
by most courts in interpreting the statute. 124
In trademark use, though, the institutional competence "gambit"
should have led to the opposite of the collapsed use doctrine.
Under that gambit, gross distortions in the clear statutory law
would normally be left to the legislature.
The collapsed use doctrine confirms the worst fears about legal
realism-that the ends would justify the means.12" 5 Use in trade
122 "The realist would insist on an open-ended weighing of policies to give meaning to the
statute, and then resort to an in-depth factual inquiry to apply the policy to the case."
McClure, supra note 23, at 341.
123 Id. at 343 (quoting Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L REv. 1685, 1751-52 (1976)).
124 Id. at 340.
12 The story of trademark use is just a scene from the larger drama of bow legal realism
"simply ran itself into the sand." Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 ButsALo L Ray. 459, 459 (1979). It is impossible to
understand the importance of this story without understanding the worst fears about legal
realism: "The early critiques directed against... legal realists tended to be mild and often
1985]
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was created by the common law to impose an obstacle, a burden, to
unchecked monopoly. The present token use rule in effect states
that because of the burden of the use in trade requirement, the
requirement must be ignored. In a stunning reversal of cause and
effect, the doctrine of use in trade was destroyed in Standard
Pressed Steel for the very reason that it exists!126 The same board
had articulated this unabashedly cynical legal philosophy even
more baldly a year earlier, calling it "an accepted commercial prac-
tice necessitated by the absence of an intent to use statute.' ' 2 7
Under this legal cynicism, the law does not proceed from norma-
tive or even statutory premises to a conclusion designed to regulate
commercial conduct. Instead it elevates commercial conduct to the
level of the major premise, proceeding from "accepted commercial
practice" to a conclusion dictated by, instead of serving to regu-
late, the practices of liberal free enterprise. A result is that this
philosophy defines existing practice as the norm.128 Thus, in re-
sponse to the institutional competence gambit, designed to sup-
discriminating, but by 1936 they were becoming almost wholly denunciatory. The tone of
the attack grew in bitterness in proportion to the spread of fear and uncertainty created by
success of the totalitarian governments of Europe." E. PURCELL, supra note 121, at 159.
Fundamental to the attack on realism was the belief that it did, or at least could,
lead to totalitarianism.... Positivism... could lead to Nazism when applied to the
law, for it denied any rational moral standard and tended to identify all government
and judicial actions by definition with legality.
During the late thirties, however, he [Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound]
grew increasingly hostile. In 1937 he charged that the realists identified law com-
pletely with the actions of government officials, an accusation meant to imply that
the realist view left no basis from which to criticize the legal acts of the Nazi
government.
Id. at 161-62.
128 For the Board's rationale, see supra text accompanying note 54.
127 Monorail Car Wash, Inc. v. McCoy, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434, 438 (TTAB 1973).
"[T]here is no doubt that applicant's initial shipment was contrived ... expressly for regis-
tration purposes, but this is more or less an accepted commercial practice necessitated by
the absence of an intent to use statute." Id.
128 This is neo-realism, or perhaps nihilism, the extension of legal realism to its most
unprincipled extreme. It is exactly what Morris Cohen feared from a legal theory that "nat.
urally leads to the assumption that what is, is right." Cohen, Book Review, CORNELL L.Q,
171, 177 (1936). Those fears were fed by such people as Karl Llewellyn, who was committed
to realism and wrote that "[w]hat these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law
itself." K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (2d ed. 1951). He was such a believer that, in
helping draft the Uniform Commercial Code, he "revisited the National City Bank to ob.
serve how bank collections were transacted." W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REAL.-
IST MovEMENT 316 (1973); see also supra note 125.
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press legal realism, trademark law had an effective response: the
administrative parry. The utility of institutional competence as-
sumed and required the ability to distinguish a court from a politi-
cal, legislative, body. The administrative parry involved the crea-
tion and maturation of hybrid organs-administrative agencies
-which, being neither legislative nor judicial, were not adequately
addressed by institutional competence. The administrative parry is
responsible for token use.
One advantage of the theory of "institutional competence"'1 29 is
that it could confine political and legal domains. A central feature
of judicial institutions, of course, is autonomy. Judicial indepen-
dence, or at least its appearance, is secured in federal courts by life
tenure, which protects against both job insecurity and illicit temp-
tations. Administrative judges, including Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board commissioners, do not have these protections." 0 Thus,
the "revolving door" phenomenon swings in both directions for
Patent and Trademark Office personnel.' 3 ' Not only is it possible
for the Board to hear cases argued by former members but present
members, when deciding cases, have no assurances about their pro-
fessional futures. According to Judge Richard Posner, certainly no
radical, the uncertain professional careers of administrators almost
always foreclose the possibility of any "zealous" vindication of the
consumer's interest.132
129 H. HART & A. SACHS, supra note 121. The "legal process" teaches a kind of procedural
jurisprudence bottomed in a distinction between "legal" judicial activities and "political"
legislative ones. See supra note 121.
130 As one of my research assistants noted, the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Lanham Act were both enacted in 1946. It is a provocative coincidence at least. The devel-
opment of procedures securing agency law happily coincided with a crucial era in trademark
law when radical judicial alterations might have been created by federal judges subject to
the influence of legal realism.
I Allen, The "Revolving Door"--Should It Be Stopped?, 32 AD. L. Rv. 383 (1980).
132 Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHL L, REv. 47 (1969). He states:
A commissioner concerned with his future success at the bar will have no greater
incentive to promote the consumer interest fearlessly and impartially than one whose
guiding principles are job retention and agency aggrandizement. He will receive no
bonus upon entry (or reentry) into private practice for the vigorous championing of
the consumer interest. The gratitude of consumers-indulging the improbable as-
sumption that such a thing exists--cannot be translated into a larger practice. On the
other hand, the enmity of the organized economic interests... that a zealous pursuit
of consumer interests would engender may do him some later harm, while making his
tenure with the Commission more tense and demanding than would otherwise be the
case. Exceptional people may rise to the challenge but they are unlikely ever to con-
1985]
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It is unconvincing to suppose that administrators can avoid bias
simply through will power and good faith. If that were so, the arti-
cle III protections would imply that federal judges somehow lack
the character that their administrative siblings possess. It is ines-
capable that decisions of the Board are inevitably subject to the
pressures, perhaps felt only unconsciously, of job insecurity and
the perceived desires, perhaps only imaginary, of future employers
and clients.13 3 The combination, within administrative law, of a
"legal" form and a "political" environment thus effectively disarms
the theory of institutional competence.
The phenomenon that James Q. Wilson has described of agency
"capture" by those the agency purportedly regulates and the exis-
tence of a "clientele" relationship between the agency and those it
is charged with regulating is nothing new.134 Posner notes that reg-
ulation can be a blessing to the regulated,' 35 and he suggests that it
should not be presumed beneficial to the consumer. 36
Gabriel Kolko claimed that administrative regulation was cre-
ated at the insistence of the regulated as protection from competi-
stitute a sizable fraction of commissioners.
Id. at 86.
For instance, it is remarkable that the author of all the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board's collapsed trademark use decisions was Commissioner Lefkowitz, who wrote the
opinions in Fort Howard, Standard Pressed Steel, Monorail Car Wash, Times Mirror, and
Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Bozo Texinos-A Mexican Cafe, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 430
(1979). He has since left the Board and is now a member of a firm whose recent clientele
includes General Electric, Cooper Industries, PPG Industries, Kaiser Industries, Digital
Equipment, Premo Pharmaceutical, Special Metals Corp., Comptek Research, Classic Prod.
ucts, Lactite Corp., Foster Wheeler, Grefco, Inc., and Crucible, Inc.
133 Some agencies have attempted to solve this problem, such as the Department of En-
ergy and the Civil Aeronautics Board. See 42 U.S.C. § 7216 (1982) (disqualifying former
members from participating in "matters" in which they were involved); 14 C.F.R. § 300.10
(1984). These provisions, however, can hardly resolve the problem of participation in doc.
trines, rather than matters, such as the doctrine of collapsed trademark use, which favor
entire industries.
'" See Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PuB. INTEREST 77, 87-89 (1975).
See generally M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMIISSION (1955).
35 R. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-86 (2d ed. 1977).
186
[R]egulation is a product, much like other products except supplied by the govern-
ment, that is demanded by and supplied to effective political groups. Under this view,
there is no presumption that regulation is always or even often designed to protect
the broad consumer interest in the efficient supply of the regulated services.
Id. at 268.
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tion.137 More recently, this theory has been criticized for failing to
recognize that not all regulated subjects invariably benefit from
such anticompetitive phenomena. To these later critics, the signifi-
cance of administrative law lies in its substitution of majoritarian
politics and "organized interests" for legal standards.3 8 But with
trademark law, all of the "organized interests" have one thing in
common: a desire to secure trademark rights as easily as possible.
At least with the trademark use doctrine, it hardly matters
whether Wilson or Kolko is correct: either through agency capture
or through the assignment of the dispute to a board before whom
antitrademark interests are absent, the general interests of the
agency clientele are served.
Although the effect of professional groups upon substantive doc-
trinal change has not yet received serious jurisprudential attention,
the trademark use doctrine is a useful case study. The combination
of a receptive Patent and Trademark Office and a vigorously inter-
ested trademark bar has been decisive in the development of the
collapsed trademark use doctrine. The jurisprudential effect of a
specialized bar-particularly prominent, of course, in Patent and
Trademark Office matters-appears quite significant, especially in
the context of a heavily administrative environment.139
Thus, the characters on the stage of trademark law are strangely
different from those of most other legal dramas. There is no real
antitrademark lobby. No serious trademark lawyers or their clients
have any interest in undermining the basic anticompetitive orien-
tation of modern trademark law. While lawyers may argue their
clients' opposing positions, no client or lawyer has any interest in
urging that trademark law, as presently structured, is opposed to
the public interest or that trademark registrations should be made
137 Q KOLKO. TiH TmuMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963).
11 See Wilson, supra note 134, at 94-95.
The true significance of the Commerce Act is not that it allowed public power to be
used to make secure private wealth but that it created a federal commission with
broadly delegated powers that would have to reconcile conflicting goals... in a po-
litical environment characterized by a struggle among organized interests and rapidly
changing technology.
Id. Wilson observes that majoritarian politics tends to replace coalitional politics when regu-
lation is granted to those interest groups powerful enough to successfully demand it. Id. at
97.
11' For a discussion of the trademark bar, see supra note 95 and text accompanying notes
104 & 106.
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generally more difficult. No lawyers employed by clients owning
many trademarks can imagine such clients happily receiving news
of a victory that, while defeating an opponent's trademark, would
invalidate all of the clients' "warehoused" marks as well. In a kind
of "old-boy" network, all, except for the occasional "maverick,"" 0
have an interest in an interpretation that makes registrations
easy.
1 4 1
In other words, all established trademark owners have a common
interest in excluding newcomers. The Board, having no defined in-
terest, nevertheless gains nothing by antagonizing its established
clientele. The token use doctrine effectively offers the agency's one
valuable and vital resource to its organized clientele at a cheaper
price.
"The second major public resource commonly sought by an in-
dustry is control over entry by new rivals."' 42 When this resource is
brokered by an agency, which it always is, the problems of admin-
istrative law favoring an established clientele and large organiza-
tions 143 achieve even greater prominence-especially in the context
of trademark law. Trademark law is an area that is not generally
recognized as anticompetitive, in which the grant of the public re-
source has been made even more liberal than what its statutory
authors intended. The peculiarly hybrid nature of administrative
law crosses the border between the legislative and the judicial and
seems expressly tailored to avoid the institutional competence
140 See Fletcher, supra note 31, at 350:
[N]obody will "upgrade" his "use" program, and everybody will continue as before,
filing affidavits which in light of present knowledge of the law verge ever closer to
fraudulent, trusting to (hopefully unspoken or written) industry understandings not
to attack each other's marks for fear of retaliation, and hoping no maverick comes
along at an inopportune moment.
141 One reason Willy Loman's life became hopelessly doomed was because he was found
sleeping with the wrong woman. See Death of a Salesman, supra note 1, at 206-09. The
marketing connection is perhaps coincidental but it is undeniable that the person with
whom he should not have been sleeping was, in Willy's words, "just a buyer." When he was
discovered by his son Biff, his attempt to justify or explain his actions was suspiciously
similar to what one might imagine a staunch defender of administrative law would say:
Willy:... Now look, Biff, when you grow up you'll understand about these things.
You mustn't-you mustn't overemphasize a thing like this.
Id. at 298.
142 Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 3, 5 (1971).
1' For one description of the problems, see infra note 146.
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gambit that depends upon that distinction."4
Even if there were some maverick entrant,"5 it probably would
not be successful in the administrative arena. Critics such as Rob-
ert Reich have observed that the administrative process itself is
structurally receptive to established, large organizations.1  Reich's
observations perfectly fit the Patent and Trademark Office prac-
tice and are actually heightened by the fact that trademark pro-
ceedings are often ex parte. In fact, the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice tends to make adversary challenges even more difficult by
frequently characterizing issues as "ex parte," despite being
scolded occasionally for doing so.147
Comparing the cases of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
with those of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals makes it
clear that the administrative process has been key in the develop-
ment of the token use doctrine. The leading cases from the Board
tend to repeat the same distortions and mistakes that have illegiti-
21" Of course, none of this is surprising or new. It is essentially the result that Roscoe
Pound somewhat pessimistically forecasted over three decades ago when he listed and then
rebutted the six supposed constraints upon unbounded administrative discretion. First, he
noted that the administrative process moves in a narrow field. But he found that confining
the process leads to looking to all things from the standpoint of that narrow field, thus
ignoring disputed questions. Second, this narrow field develops a professional attitude.
Pound argued, however, that this is a chief reason why judicial review is urgently demanded.
Third, findings of fact may be made. But, he noted, too often there are no means to assure a
proper basis for the findings. He found that the fourth constraint, the relation of adjudica-
tion to policy, is one of the most flagrant abuses because it allows the fitting of preconcep-
tions of facts to a policy. The fifth constraint of independent tribunals "will not have the
constitutional guarantee of independence that the courts have." Finally, the sixth con-
straint, judicial review, "is not allowed to be the check that it ought to be." R. PouNo, Jus-
Trice AccoRDNG To LAw 79-81 (1951).
I'l Fletcher, supra note 31, at 350.
146
Inequalities lie deep in the administrative structure of government largess. The
whole process of acquiring it and keeping it favors some applicants and recipients
over others. The administrative process is characterized by uncertainty, delay, and
inordinate expense; to operate within it requires considerable know-how. All of these
factors strongly favor larger, richer, more experienced companies or individuals over
smaller ones.
All these inequalities modify somewhat the simple picture of a government-private
dichotomy. But a second modification is required. government and the private sector
(or a favored part of that sector) are often partners rather than opposing interests.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 765 (1964).
147 See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 390 F.2d 1015, 1017 n.6
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
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mately altered trademark use.148 By comparison, the leading cases
from the Court of Appeals take a more equivocal position. Though
the court sometimes sanctions a liberal approach, it does so with-
out departing from a relatively strict and, historically and t6xtually
speaking, correct statement of law.149 One might object that judi-
cial review compensates for agency error. But this fails to acknowl-
edge the persuasive effect of administrative decisions upon appel-
late courts. In addition to the statutory presumptions to which
Patent and Trademark Office and Board decisions are entitled,
many courts treat Board decisions with a certain deference.
The impact of the Board decisions is heightened by the tendency
of trial courts, which apparently feel they have little expertise in
trademark law, to treat the Patent and Trademark Office as a
source of legal as well as technical competence.' 0 One district
court, holding that affidavits of token use were not thereby false or
fraudulent, did so by relying on the "prominent legal authority" of
the Board decisions that had approved token use.5 Even appel-
late courts occasionally hold agency decisions to be persuasive or
even authoritative. 52 Another way Board decisions achieve undue
influence is through the trademark treatises that commonly derive
"rules" of trademark law from agency decisions. Those treatises
M48 Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. Life Code Sys., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 740 (TTAB 1983); In
re Cedar Point, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 533 (TTAB 1983); Times Mirror Magazine, Inc. v.
Sutcliffe, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656 (TTAB 1979); Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Bozo Tex-
inos-A Mexican Cafe, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430 (TTAB 1979); Standard Pressed Steel
Co. v. Midwest Chrome Process Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 758 (TTAB 1974); Monorail Car
Wash, Inc. v. McCoy, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434 (TTAB 1973).
149 See Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc. 579 F.2d 75 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Old Swiss
House, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 569 F.2d 1130 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Silenus Wines,
Inc., 557 F.2d 806 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Jim Dandy Co. v. Martha White Foods, 458 F.2d 1397
(C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Gastown, Inc., 326 F.2d 780 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 F.2d 842 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
150 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983); see also
Li'l Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98, 104 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (relying
upon and citing only that portion of the Fort Howard case that repeated the underlying
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decision). Another example is Standard Pressed Steel
Co. v. Midwest Chrome Process Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 758 (TTAB 1974), which did not
turn on any technical characteristics of trademark, but instead was based upon the legal and
policy considerations of the proper balance of our free enterprise system-exactly the mat-
ters that modern process-based theories of law supposedly consign to legislatures.
"I DeMert & Dougherty, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1194, 1197 (N.D.
Ill. 1972).
'11 See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).
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are then used by appellate courts as authority."'
The freedom from constraint with which the administrative pro-
cess tends to operate, the alliance of shared interests between the
regulated and the regulators, the practical impact of agency deci-
sions upon lower and appellate courts, and the way the hybrid na-
ture of the agency effectively disarms the institutional competence
gambit mean that the administrative parry is more than just juris-
prudential theory.
IV. SELLING THE SALESMAN: THE IDEOLOGICAL ROLE
OF LEGAL THEORIES
The administrative parry created a sufficiently large but se-
cluded area in which law could be altered to fit the demands of
established marketers without sacrificing the legitimizing ideologi-
cal function of the legal system. The law repeated in treatises and
applied in the courts remained outwardly the same'--consistent,
certain, predictable-while doctrines such as token use, developed
in response to demands of marketing expediency, contradicted
those principles. The administrative parry allowed vast portions of
the marketplace to be effectively deeded over to established mar-
keters-and to "regulation" by the agency-without any need to
comply with accepted legal process. In effect there are two legal
universes: the administrative, where power is brokered, and the ju-
dicial, which maintains its legitimizing role through the rule of
law.155
I" For example, the court in Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433, 437 (2d
Cir. 1974), calls Callmann's Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies one of the
three "leading commentators." But many of the current sections of Callmann'a treatise
which detail the contours of trademark use are literally studded with references to Patent
and Trademark Office and Board decisions. See 3 R CALLmANN, supra note 108, §§ 19.06-
.07, 19.09. For some indication that these treatises are less than models of accuracy, see
supra note 108.
I" In fact, judicial trademark law, with the exception of maverick doctrines initiated
within the administrative environment-such as token use-has continued in a formalistic
manner. "The courts have applied the Lanham Act in an excessively formal manner, believ-
ing that linguistic categories dictate certain results." McClure, supra note 23, at 341; see,
e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
'" In Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. Rm. 379,
414, the author vigorously contests this theory. But the most apt description of the develop-
ment of the collapsed trademark use doctrine is contained in a footnote which describes one
feature of Isaac Balbus's theory of legal legitimization: "In a later work, Balbus suggests
that an order could cling to legitimacy, even while violating each of its own norms, so long as
HeinOnline  -- 19 Ga. L. Rev. 275 1984-1985
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
According to McClure, legal realism was stopped dead in its
tracks by the institutional competence gambit. 56 That gambit en-
sured that realism, with its recognition of actual economic facts,
would not alter trademark law. But in trademark use, the Board's
decisions can only be explained by neo-realist, or perhaps even ni-
hilist 157 legal philosophies. As McClure noted, the Lanham Act es-
sentially froze trademark law into a private orientation which fa-
vored protection and monopolization. Therefore, in those few areas
where it did not fully favor private marketing interests, such as the
failure to enact an intent-to-use statute, one might have expected
either legal formalism or the institutional competence gambit to
prevent any significant change in that direction. But, nevertheless,
trademark use was radically altered, mostly due to the administra-
tive parry.
Thus, it is not quite true that in trademark law "the legal realist
revolution never arrived."1' 58 The story of trademark use is really
the story of institutional competence unrealized. Its gambit was
met by the administrative parry. That parry most effectively ex-
plains the strange saga of trademark use. It seems to teach that the
Patent and Trademark Office is free to apply formalistic law, to
adopt legal realism, or to break all the bounds of legal theory at its
whim. 15 9 The Board decisions that have collapsed use in trade and
use in commerce because of the economic needs of marketers are
the most crass examples of legal realism at its worst.160 But it is
it succeeded in having individuals regard themselves as objects of fetishized legal relations,
rather than as subjects who create and control the legal order." Id. at 414 n.113. Hyde's
attack on legitimization theories is partially based on his objection to "collapsing the norma-
tive into the descriptive." Id. at 420. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid that col-
lapse, however, when the subject, the legal system, uses that process to accomplish its re-
sulting legitimization. Furthermore, the distinction between normative and descriptive may
be attractive-it serves its own legitimizing goals-but it i's probably more deceptive than
real. See Davis, supra note 11.
"6 McClure, supra note 23, at 340, 342-43.
1M7 See Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. Soc'Y PuB. TCHnS. L. 20, 22, 30
(1980); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law
Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1307 (1979).
158 McClure, supra note 23, at 340.
259 Of course, while the Patent and Trademark Office has been wildly unrestrained, the
courts have generally toed the party line of "reasoned elaboration." See id. at 342. But there
is nothing in reasoned elaboration that prevents courts from adopting administrative deci-
sions-in an elaborately reasoned way. Thus, unrestrained realism can masquerade within
an institutionally competent role through the device of reasoned elaboration.
110 See supra notes 121, 125 & 128 (discussing realism and other jurisprudential theories).
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crucial to recognize that this degradation occurred predominantly
within the administrative process.
One way the legal system effects legitimization is by using the
language of the dominant political ideology, articulating formalistic
doctrines in such a way that the ideological symbolism is preserved
while the language is gutted of substance. The twin goals of legi-
timization and expedience are available because the enormous flex-
ibility in the "rules" allows illegitimate demands to be met while
the rule of law remains apparently secure.161 This observation can
proceed, however, too far. It is one thing to believe that words,
even legal words, have little meaning. It is quite another to say
that they have none-that every argument is just as easily
"flipped" towards one as towards its opposite conclusion. 62 If any
argument is possible, there would have been no need to retreat to
the agency-no need for the administrative parry-to construct an
altered trademark use rule. The inescapable point from a study of
trademark use is that the administrative parry was useful-that it
was an effective response to the gambit of institutional competence
and to the perceived constraints of that theory. 63 Thus the admin-
See Davis, supra note 11.
The argument that legal doctrines are easily "flipped" is now popular in Critical Legal
Studies circles--or was at the time this article was written (without almost any doubt it is
now passXe)-and claims that legal distinctions are founded upon conceptions that logically
lead to diametrically opposite conclusions-depending, perhaps, on how the question is
posed or perceived. All legal rules therefore "logically" self-destruct because they have no
real content. As with all things critical, the political conclusions of this theory are what
matter. Without content, legal rules could have no autonomous, nor even semi-autonomous,
role. There is no explicitly "flipping" literature yet-maybe no one has the nerve-but a few
writers have used the theory to advantage. See Kennedy, supra note 27; see also id. at 1350
n.2 (citing articles).
A difficulty of using Death of a Salesman as a demonstrative vehicle is that the play is
premised on contradictions that remain unresolved, much like the underlying contradictions
of trademark law, one might say that Salesman can be flipped as well one way as the other.
"No wonder Death of a Salesman cannot make up its mind .... Miller is a playwright who
wants morality without bothering to speak of a good in the light of which morality would
make sense." Driver, supra note 1, at 51-52. Without deciding whether human beings should
be subject to the exploitation of free competition and without deciding upon a good by
which morality or legality can be judged, it is hopeless to attempt to draw a line between
good exploitation and bad. This is the realist dilemma. See supra note 125.
163 I emphasize the word "perceived" because whatever constraints the law imposes may
be simply a matter of (false?) perceptions, although I am not sure that that does not make
them limits nonetheless. Though this comes perilously close to a form of neo-institutional
competence, others have made similar observations. They have simply avoided exploring, so
far, the dynamics of such a theory.
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istrative parry has been an effective partner to formalism, the
parry offering new areas of freedom when the limits of formalism's
flexibility were reached.
In other words, it is the administrative parry itself that bears
effective testimony to the claim that there is something to the no-
tion that legal forms and substance have, at least in the context of
a given time and place, a meaning to which "attention must be
paid.'1 64 The administrative parry created a separate legal domain
where doctrine could bend to the will of the powerful, while pre-
serving the legitimizing influence of a separate judicial world where
principle and certainty seem to survive. The creation of the other
world would have been unnecessary if it were not so important to
preserve a judicial one which still could sport the trappings of a
legitimizing rule of law.
And now we return to Willy Loman one last time. Willy, you see,
was first deceived, then killed. All Willy wanted was to be success-
ful, and in many ways he was. There were, sadly, two sets of rules.
The rules that Willy followed were the rules that all Salesmen are
given; they are, in fact, our rules.165 Those rules say that to be well
I assume that the only grounds for distinguishing between courts, legislatures and
administrative agencies as lawmakers are (i) that the false consciousness of the public
requires it or (ii) that the decision maker has a quite specific theory about how his or
her particular institutional situation should modify his or her pursuit of political
objectives.
Kennedy, supra note 11, at 564-65. Although Kennedy has "nothing to say" about this pos-
sibility, id. at 564, it seems ripe, perhaps crucial, for further study.
14 Death of a Salesman, supra note 1, at 162.
Linda: . . .I don't say he's a great man. Willy Loman never made a lot of money.
His name was never in the paper. He's not the finest character that ever lived. But
he's a human being, and a terrible thing is happening to him. So attention must be
paid. He's not to be allowed to fall into his grave like an old dog. Attention, attention
must be finally paid to such a person.
Id.
165
Between 1868 and 1929 [Horatio] Alger's books sold ten million copies, and the peo-
ple who did not read the books could hardly have been able to escape the aura of the
name. With the boom of the 1920s authors like Babson and Marsden and Bruce Bar-
ton kept the success doctrine before the eyes of the public. Whether they advocated
success as the reward of virtue or as the result of strength or as the consequent of
personality, their position was essentially the same. The secret lies inside the individ-
ual character. The emphasis can shift from one personal quality to another, but there
is never any doubt where the quality is found. Moreover, if Christianity can be de-
fined by business concepts, "virtues" can easily be reduced to "personality." The
"miracles" of Jesus, according to Barton, reside in his personal magnetism .... This
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liked is the road to success. Willy followed it to his end. Nobody
told Willy that the game was fixed-but it was. It was in Howard's
interest, and in the interest of his father before him, to encourage
Willy to be well liked. But Howard would have been a fool, I sup-
pose, to tell Willy that there were other things, more important
things, in life.
The world of people, the world of "massive dreams and little
cruelties,"""6 the Brooklyns of our existence, became far more im-
poverished without the magnetic Willy Loman who, no matter how
misdirected, was very well liked. Only in a market economy where
all is translated into dollars and cents could a person as alive as
Willy Loman reason that he was worth less with every breath he
took. 6 7 But the world of the Salesman continued. Dead wood is
just that-in law and in the market.
The market economy is no fool. There are two sets of rules. The
rules we believe in reflect our hopes about right and wrong, about
equality and justice, about freedom and, perhaps, about property.
Most of us believe in these things and in a legal system that fash-
ions rules pinned to those hopes. It would be foolish to tell us, I
suppose, that in response to each progressively developed legal the-
ory there is a response, a gambit, and then a parry-there is always
a different, unseen set of rules-that allows the other things, the
more important things, the things that in the end lead to our
doom, to mock the rules in which we have been led to believe so
desperately.
myth, deep-seated in the American consciousness, provides the raw material for
Death of a Salesman.
T. PORTER, supra note 1, at 131.
166 Death of a Salesman, supra note 1, at 131.
167 Willy killed himself so that his family might have the insurance money. He saw him-
self as nothing more than one element in a purchase and sale, which is not surprising since
he was, after all, a Salesman. The reduction of Willy from a person to a cipher of the market
economy is perhaps the dominant theme of the play. "He is a product of a producer-con-
sumer society in which the go-between is a pivotal figure. [Blefore he can sell anything and
if he can sell nothing else, he must sell himself, his own personality." T. PoRTR7A supra note
1, at 133-34.
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